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DISSENTING FROM WITHIN: 
WHY AND HOW PUBLIC OFFICIALS RESIST THE LAW 
ADAM SHINAR?
ABSTRACT
 This Article examines why and how public officials consciously resist the laws and poli-
cies they are in charge of implementing. The Article argues that this phenomenon is not an 
anomaly, but rather pervasive and unavoidable. It occurs in all government institutions and 
is facilitated by the same structures that are designed to promote compliance. 
 The Article attempts to uncover the causes which render official resistance possible, 
arguing that resistance can be traced both to the limits inherent in the rule of law and to 
problems of institutional design. It then explores the strategies officials deploy to effectu-
ate their resistance, ranging from blatant defiance to outsourcing resistance to private 
actors; from immunizing actions from judicial review to ordinary acts of interpretation and 
administrative prioritization.
 The Article then turns to discuss the normative implications official resistance gener-
ates. While official resistance is often portrayed as undermining law, and therefore undesir-
able, such a position is simplistic and ignores the benefits it entails, in particular those for 
triggering public discourse, unblocking political channels, and policy change. The Article 
also considers the ways in which official resistance can contribute to more just outcomes and 
more efficient regulatory arrangements. This counterintuitive conclusion should lead us to 
reexamine our notions of the rule of law, compliance, and obedience. Consequently, the Arti-
cle advances a more nuanced approach and suggests how to take resistance into account in 
the ex ante design of laws and policies and in the ex post application of enforcement and 
monitoring measures.    
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I. INTRODUCTION
 The standard picture of lawmaking and law enforcement envisions 
the legislature passing a law, agencies and courts implementing the 
law, individuals obeying the law, and compliance generally achieved.1
Of course, most laws are not complied with to the fullest. Living in a 
society with limited enforcement resources means that some infrac-
tions will inevitably go either unnoticed or unenforced.2 However, as 
long as the law is not violated most of the time by most citizens, the 
legal system is not considered to be in jeopardy.3 This account, com-
mon and important as it is, is incomplete, for it overlooks the phe-
nomenon of dissent within and among government institutions. 
Whereas dissent is usually conceptualized as being part of the pri-
vate sphere and directed against state authority, such as civil diso-
bedience and conscientious objection, the legal and political contesta-
tion that goes on within the state apparatus is relatively ignored.4
Legal scholars and social scientists who study compliance tend to fo-
cus on how to effectively implement public policy5 or on how to secure 
1. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 298 (1999) (describing 
the standard picture). 
2. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: 
Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960) (explor-
ing how certain crimes go unenforced based on the discretion of individuals such as law 
enforcement). On the role of prosecutorial discretion in the federal system, see, for exam-
ple, Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 392 (2009).
3. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 707, 741-42 (2009) (arguing that the gap between law on the books and law in action is 
widespread and usually does not threaten our legal system or constitute a constitutional crisis). 
4. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258-59 (2009) (noting the dearth of federalism literature on state  
resistance to federal authority). 
5. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER 
A BILL BECOMES A LAW (Jeffrey Pressman & Martha Weinberg eds., 1977); MICHAEL HILL 
& PETER HUPE, IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
42 (2002); Lawrence Baum, Comparing the Implementation of Legislative and Judicial 
Policies, in EFFECTIVE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 39 (Daniel A. Mazmanian & Paul A. Saba-
tier eds., 1981). 
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the compliance of citizens and regulated industries.6 They think 
much less about securing compliance of public officials. And even 
when they do, they typically address structural issues such as insti-
tutional design, underperformance, delays and costs.7
 This Article focuses on another, less explored, type of official be-
havior, which I term official resistance. Resistance is not merely be-
havior confined to the private realm, vis-à-vis the state, of individu-
als not complying with laws. Resistance is also practiced by state 
agents against their own institutions or by governmental institutions 
against other, superior institutions. Moreover, resistance is not a uni-
form type of behavior that is immediately apprehensible. It is a spec-
trum of behaviors, ranging from open defiance to calculated acts of 
noncompliance and to more covert forms of expressing disagreement. 
Official resistance, however, has not drawn sufficient attention in 
contemporary legal scholarship. 
 Consider, for example, the paradigmatic case of civil disobedience 
in the United States—the civil rights movement.8 Despite the abun-
dance of literature, much less attention has been given to the forms 
of resistance deployed by public officials in their attempts to resist 
Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny.9 A voluminous litera-
ture has documented these acts,10 but we have yet to think in a com-
prehensive manner or theorize the phenomenon itself, as opposed to 
noting its occurrence. Moreover, the literature that does address offi-
cial resistance often focuses on resistance to court decisions, down-
playing the more general phenomenon of resistance.11
6. See, e.g., KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND 
THE SOCIAL DEFINITION OF POLLUTION (1984) (discussing compliance with environmental 
regulation); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (examining what makes law 
compliance legitimate in the eyes of individuals); James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance,
36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818 (1998) (discussing compliance with tax laws). For exceptions, 
see BARDACH, supra note 5 and Farber, supra note 1, at 300 (arguing that the “problem  
of obtaining compliance . . . is pervasive” and that “[i]t deserves much more attention than 
it has received”).  
7. See, e.g., BARDACH, supra note 5, at 5. 
8. Although a large part of that movement was not characterized by illegal resistance, 
it did encompass illegal activities such as demonstrations without permits and sit-ins. 
9. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 
U.S. 294 (1955). 
10. See, e.g., KAREN ANDERSON, LITTLE ROCK: RACE AND RESISTANCE AT CENTRAL 
HIGH SCHOOL (2010); NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND 
POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S (1969); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM 
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 
290-442 (2004). 
11. See, e.g., KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER 
DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE 9 (1971) (acknowledging that the au-
thors are only examining resistance to court decisions). Similarly, Michael Klarman’s work 
on backlash focuses on resistance to courts, and his writing on official resistance is a corol-
lary of that. See Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash 
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 This Article aims to fill this gap by making two overarching ar-
guments. First, official resistance is a complex phenomenon that can 
and does occur in every institution, from federal administrative 
agencies to local municipalities. In that sense, it is both pervasive 
and inescapable. Indeed, official resistance can be so embedded in the 
governmental scheme that it will either go undetected, considered to 
be routine, or there will be significant costs, political or other, for 
those who contemplate bringing action. These claims are not necessari-
ly empirical (although illustrative examples are provided throughout), 
but rather flow from the nature of a legal system, from institutional 
interactions, and from the background structures in which governmen-
tal institutions operate. Resistance, then, is inherent to public institu-
tions. Second, it is not only institutional structures that generate of-
ficial resistance; inherent and irresolvable tensions between the rule 
of law and human agency provide officials with opportunities to resist 
the laws they are in charge of administering.  
 Institutional design can contribute to the heightening of the ten-
sion between the rule of law and human agency. However, whereas 
institutional design can alleviate the tension, it cannot eliminate it 
completely. Indeed, the same mechanisms that seek to guarantee com-
pliance with the law, such as the rule of law and organizational hierar-
chies, are the ones which also facilitate its violation. Paradoxically, 
eliminating official resistance means giving up on the rule of law. In a 
world without rules, there will be no resistance to rules. But since no 
state can operate without rules, resistance will never disappear.  
 Drawing on a diverse body of literature, from legal theory and so-
ciology of law to organizational sociology and political psychology, 
this Article argues that our portrayal of official resistance as inher-
ently wrong and undesirable is simplistic and often misguided. In-
deed, official resistance generates questions that have long been ne-
glected by legal scholars, in particular its role in legal theory, politi-
cal life, and institutional design. For example, whether there is an 
obligation to obey the law is a perennial question in legal theory; the 
corresponding obligation of public officials is either assumed or not 
discussed. In politics, officials resisting the law are often negatively 
portrayed, but the beneficial impact resistance has on unblocking 
clogged political channels and triggering political discourse is ig-
nored. Similarly, scholars rarely acknowledge how official acts of re-
sistance can lead to more just outcomes or more efficient arrange-
ments. Indeed, the role official resistance plays in policy change is 
Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994); see also James P. Levine, Methodological Concerns in 
Studying Supreme Court Efficacy, in COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW: A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY 
APPROACH 99 (Samuel Krislov et al. eds., 1972) (suggesting a conceptual framework for 
investigating noncompliance with court decisions). 
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one that is seldom contemplated, let alone theorized. Finally, official 
resistance implicates issues of institutional design. If resistance has 
beneficial as well as harmful consequences, institutional design must 
be sensitive to its occurrence, both in the ex ante design of laws and 
policies and in the ex post enforcement stage of official misconduct.  
 Accordingly, this Article proceeds as follows. Part II will distin-
guish private resistance from official resistance and define the scope 
of official resistance. Part III will discuss what makes official re-
sistance possible. I provide two explanations: individualistic and in-
stitutional. Individualistic reasons tend to focus on the role of human 
agency in official resistance and why officials might choose to resist 
the law. Institutional reasons take into account the structure of insti-
tutions and their interactions. Combining these reasons leads to the 
conclusion that the concept of rule of law, when understood descrip-
tively, often mischaracterizes the operation of the legal-governmental 
system. Given that official resistance exists, Part IV asks how it is 
instantiated. Specifically, I examine the strategies that officials and 
institutions deploy when they translate their desire to resist into ac-
tion. Although there can be many strategies, I focus on those that I 
take to be most salient. Part V discusses the implications resulting 
from the foregoing analysis. Part VI concludes.  
II. WHAT IS OFFICIAL RESISTANCE?
A.   Official Resistance vs. Private Resistance 
 We are accustomed to think of resistance to law as pitting citizen 
against government. Henry David Thoreau referred to government 
officials as either “wooden men,” machines with no judgment, or as 
“serv[ing] the Devil, without intending it, as God.”12 Martin Luther 
King, Jr., in Letter from Birmingham Jail, discussed the duty to obey 
just laws and the moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.13 Ma-
hatma Gandhi’s philosophy of Satyagraha (loosely translated as the 
force of truth) consisted of nonviolent resistance to unjust laws.14 To 
be sure, Thoreau, King, and Gandhi were writing about the problems 
of their time. Thoreau refused to pay taxes because of his opposition 
to the Mexican-American War and to slavery. King was resisting the 
segregationist regime in the South, and Gandhi used Satyagraha as a 
means to fight the colonialist British Empire. Still, what the three 
had in common is the assumption that resistance is actuated by pri-
12. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 267 (George Stade ed., 
Barnes & Noble Classics 2003) (1849). 
13. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 84 (1964). 
14. George Hendrick, The Influence of Thoreau’s “Civil Disobedience” on Gandhi’s 
Satyagraha, 29 NEW ENG. Q. 462, 464-65 (1956).  
606 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:601 
vate individuals protesting an unjust action by the state.15 As a re-
sult, their focus was on whether and when an individual has a right 
or an obligation to resist the law.
 At the same time, political and moral philosophers who have writ-
ten on dissent also tend to portray the state as a unitary actor with a 
coherent hierarchical structure.16 Indeed, those who are contemplat-
ing resistance will usually not care too much whether they are violat-
ing a federal statute, an administrative policy, a local ordinance, or a 
judicial decision. What they are concerned with is resisting a state 
order in the form that it appears before them. Of course, the sanc-
tions for violating different types of legal orders might be different, 
as are the chances of being caught and the impact of the act, but so 
long as the resister considers only the moral justifications, it is un-
likely that the source of the legal directive would control her deci-
sionmaking.17 For the resister, it is sufficient that the directive ema-
nates from the state, and for the most part the state will be perceived 
as a unitary entity.
 Official resistance challenges both of these aspects. First, it is, by 
definition, not exercised by private individuals. Second, it takes into 
account the role conceptions of public officials who resist, given their 
institutional location and the way in which they interact with other 
institutions. These points provide for three distinctions between offi-
cial and private resistance.
 First, official resistance can only be practiced by public officials. 
These can be elected officials, but it also encompasses nonelected offi-
cials, most notably administrators and members of the bureaucracy. 
Although elected officials might differ from nonelected officials in 
terms of their incentives for particular actions, both of these types of 
officials have something in common. Namely, they are state agents 
who are authorized to exercise state power. Unlike private citizens, 
they do not just have an opinion on a matter of law or policy, but  
are legally vested with the power to act on these matters and are  
duty-bound to exercise the powers given to them.18 Public officials, 
15. The same position is taken by JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 319 (rev. ed. 1999). 
16. See, e.g., Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Exec-
utive Branch Is a “They,” Not an “It,” 96 MINN. L. REV. 194, 203-15 (2011) (discussing uni-
tary state theories in natural law and international relations). The inclination to think of 
the state as a unitary actor is common. See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the 
State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ 
Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (1999). There are exceptions, though. Martin Luther King 
discussed the need to obey the “just decision” of the Supreme Court in Brown and to resist 
the unjust segregationist laws in the South. See KING, supra note 13.
17. It is true that consequentialist considerations will play a role. The expected sanc-
tion will probably be taken into consideration, but there is no necessary correlation be-
tween the severity of the sanction and the legal source from which it emanates.  
18. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1754-65 (2005).  
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then, have a special relation to the law, for they are in charge of ad-
ministering it.19 They take oaths to uphold it, making their fidelity to 
law explicit.20 Moreover, public officials, unlike private citizens, em-
body a role conception of officials. They consider themselves as pub-
lic-regarding, serving the public interest and performing a role which 
goes beyond self-interest. They view their role as officials entrusted 
with state power, and uphold themselves, at least in terms of role 
conception, to certain duties, such as being public-regarding and 
maintaining the rule of law.21 To be sure, private citizens also view 
themselves, at times, as public-regarding. However, as Bruce Acker-
man noted, this is more likely to occur during “constitutional mo-
ments”—times of high political saliency when citizens suspend self-
interest and act in the interests of the polity.22 Yet these are just 
“moments,” whereas we expect officials to consistently have a distinct  
role conception. 
 It is not merely the role conception of officials themselves that 
makes official resistance unique. It is that we, as a society, have dif-
ferent expectations from public officials than we do from private ac-
tors. The state and, by extension, its officials are different. The state 
needs special justifications for its legitimacy. There are things that 
only it can do, such as a monopoly over the use of force, and things 
that it cannot do.23 Similarly, we believe that state actors and institu-
tions should not be motivated by the same reasons as private enti-
ties. We accept that private actors are at least partially motivated by 
self-interest and profit maximization, but public officials who put 
their own interests ahead of the public interest violate their duty to 
us, the citizens. Consequently, such motivations will usually be sus-
pect. This understanding is reflected in constitutional doctrine, 
where the identity of the actor often determines the constitutionality 
of the act.24 True, public choice theorists often portray public officials 
19. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1608-09 (1986)
(explaining that there is a difference between punishment by people and its administration  
by officials).  
20. David Lyons, On Formal Justice, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 833, 858-59 (1973). 
 21. For a fuller analysis of role conception and public service motivations see James L. 
Perry et al., Revisiting the Motivational Bases of Public Service: Twenty Years of Research 
and an Agenda for the Future, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 681, 681-82 (2010) (identifying public 
spiritedness, altruism, and prosocial attitudes among public service workers). Perhaps the 
most extreme case of role conception is the willingness of antislavery judges to uphold fugi-
tive slave laws. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 119-30 (1975). 
22. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
23. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION LECTURES 32, 33 (David 
Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans. 2004).  
24. Compare Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) (finding no state 
action, thus permitting the Lodge to discriminate against blacks), with Burton v. Wilming-
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as self-interested utility maximizers,25 but even if they are descrip-
tively correct (which is debatable),26 such behavior must still be  
normatively justified.  
 Second, official resistance happens with due regard to its institu-
tional context. Indeed, the decision whether to resist or not takes into 
account the institutional location of the resister, be it an individual 
or an institution. It will usually come after a calculation of the costs 
and benefits of such resistance and the various strategies of making 
it feasible. These strategies will be uniquely related to the official 
role. For example, an administrative agency that is under a duty to 
implement legislative reforms might resist such reforms for various 
reasons. Its mode of resistance, however, will not be simple defiance 
since that is unlikely to succeed. Rather, it will depend on the partic-
ular interactions between the agency, the legislature, the courts, and 
the people, features that the private resister lacks.27 Moreover, public 
officials have tools in their toolkit that ordinary citizens do not. Of 
course, this does not mean that private resistance takes place in an 
institutional vacuum. It is only to say that official resistance takes 
place in a different institutional setting, which also affects the incen-
tives officials and institutions confront when considering resistance.  
 The third difference between private and official resistance has to 
do with its consequences. If it is the case that official resistance has 
importantly different implications, for example, for how citizens per-
ceive the legitimacy of the state, for the stability of the legal system, 
or for the harm that results from acts of official resistance as opposed 
to private resistance, there might be a different threshold for justify-
ing such resistance, if there is any at all. The consequentialist perspec-
tive suggests that the conceptual distinction between private and offi-
cial resistance can be maintained in virtue of the position of the offi-
cial—being an authority in his or her field and exercising state power. 
 These differences demonstrate the need to think of official re-
sistance as a separate category of analysis. Although the dominant 
position embraced in the literature views official resistance as a type 
ton Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (finding state action, thus prohibiting the ex-
clusion of blacks from the restaurant). 
25. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Introduction: A Brief Trajec-
tory of Public Choice and Public Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
PUBLIC LAW 1 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). 
26. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism 
and Theory in Legal Scholarship, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1139, 1140; Daryl J. Levinson, Em-
pire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 916 (2005). 
27. See, e.g., Bryan Clark & Amanda C. Leiter, Regulatory Hide and Seek: What Agen-
cies Can (and Can’t) Do to Limit Judicial Review, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1687 (2011). 
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of civil disobedience or conscientious objection,28 that view is mistak-
en. To be sure, some aspects are shared, but when resistance is prac-
ticed by officials, it implicates values and principles that simply do 
not exist, or exist to a lesser extent, in instances of private resistance.  
B.   Defining Official Resistance 
 Private resistance that is not self-interested lawbreaking has usu-
ally been conceptualized as comprising two types of phenomena: civil 
disobedience and conscientious objection. According to John Rawls, 
civil disobedience is a public act that is done in public, engaged in 
openly with fair notice, not covert or secretive, which entails invoking 
the convictions of the community.29 In conscientious objection, on the 
other hand, one simply refuses, for moral reasons, to comply with an 
order addressed to him. It is not an appeal to the sense of justice of 
the majority, and unlike civil disobedience conscientious objection is 
not necessarily based on political principles.30 Unlike civil disobedi-
ence, which, under some conceptions, has to be public, or conscien-
tious objection that invokes outright refusal, official resistance can be 
both. It is sometimes public, but very often it is not. It will sometimes 
manifest in explicit refusal but will often take on more covert forms. 
1.   What is Official Resistance? 
 In my definition of official resistance, there needs to be a subjec-
tive motivation to resist the law. An official must first decide to resist 
the law or policy in question, or that she is at least interested in ex-
ploring the possibilities of resistance, without committing herself to 
full-blown disobedience. Resistance can work itself into devising 
strategies and finally culminate in an actual behavior that is perceived 
as disobedience.
 But what does it mean to resist the law? If law is subject to inter-
pretation, can we ever really say that an official is resisting as op-
posed to interpreting the law in a way that meets her preferences? 
Under my definition, resistance is a state of mind stemming from a 
subjective motivation.31 It is dissatisfaction with what the official or 
28. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should 
Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 178 (2007) (conceptualizing resistant judges as engaging 
in “civil disobedience”). 
29. RAWLS, supra note 15, at 320. 
30. Id. at 323-24. 
31. Another sense of resistance is resistance by omission. For example, after the inval-
idation of school mandated prayer in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and School Dis-
trict v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), many schools continued practicing the prohibited 
policy. Officials refrained from finding out exactly what the Court said, and some observers 
suspected that local communities maintained the old practice. See DOLBEARE & HAMMOND,
supra note 11. 
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institution perceives to be the law. Law, then, does not present itself 
to the official as a hard social fact. What the law is, for the official, is 
the result of her engaging with the legal material—the outcome of 
the “work” she puts in.32 On this view, indeterminacy is not a proper-
ty of words, but rather the interaction between the legal actor and 
the text she is attempting to interpret.  
 This does not mean that at any given point every rule is indeter-
minate in the sense that its application will yield an unpredictable 
result. Many rules are not questioned as a matter of course—think of 
traffic laws. The reason traffic laws are predictable is precisely be-
cause the lawyer class does not think that at present arguments un-
dermining these provisions will succeed, or that there is a need to 
raise them. Thus, a legal provision can be determinate when a lawyer 
cannot make a respectable (as opposed to frivolous) argument against 
it. However, given the concept of legal “work,” almost all provisions 
are susceptible to respectable arguments, meaning an argument 
made by a socially significant set of actors.33 As Michael Freeden 
has argued more generally, “[t]o invent a new usage, or to employ 
an aberrant one, is subject only to one test: is it acceptable, or is it in 
the process of becoming acceptable, to a significant numbers [sic] of 
its users?”34
 Resistance in the sense I am using here is derived from this ap-
proach. The official encounters a legal command and, after doing 
some work trying to figure out what the law demands of her, decides 
she would rather not comply with what she takes the law to be say-
ing. This point is not trivial. In a recent article, Frederick Schauer 
posits the question: “[D]oes law constrain official action?”35 But 
phrased as such, the question is misleading. Schauer seems to as-
sume that law presents itself to the public official as a hard social 
fact or as a clear directive from a superior institution. But as a phe-
nomenological matter, this is not the case, or at least not always the 
32. This relies on the sociological indeterminacy thesis, which has been developed 
separately by Duncan Kennedy and Mark Tushnet. By adopting a sociological angle, Ken-
nedy and Tushnet focus on the work legal actors do when they confront a legal text. They 
argue that indeterminacy is not a property of words, but rather the interaction between the 
legal actor and the text she is attempting to interpret. See Duncan Kennedy, A Left Phe-
nomenological Alternative to the Hart/Kelsen Theory of Legal Interpretation, in LEGAL 
REASONING: COLLECTED ESSAYS 153 (Gianni Vattimo & Santiago Zabala eds., 2008); Dun-
can Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986); Mark V. Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, in ANA-
LYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 223 (Brian Bix ed., 1998). 
33. See Tushnet, supra note 32, at 228.   
34. MICHAEL FREEDEN, IDEOLOGIES AND POLITICAL THEORY: A CONCEPTUAL AP-
PROACH 53 (1998). 
35. Frederick Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Official Action?,
44 GA. L. REV. 769 (2010).  
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case. Law is an interpretive concept. When officials and institutions 
dislike what they think the law means, they will try, if they have the 
resources such as time and ability, to work the law into what they 
believe it should say. Resistance, then, is the starting point for offi-
cial action. It is a mental state,36 the instantiation of which translates 
into real action. It can, for example, culminate in outright defiance. 
While such acts will be rare, given the significant political costs,37 they 
still occur, as was the case in Southern official resistance to desegrega-
tion.38 More often, however, resistance will take on relatively covert 
forms. These and other types of official behavior are explored in Part 
IV, but for purpose of illustration I now provide two examples. 
2.   Two Examples of Official Resistance 
 In February 2004, the mayor of San Francisco, Gavin Newsom, 
instructed his county clerk to issue marriage permits to gay and les-
bian couples. Aware of a California statute stating that only mar-
riage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in Califor-
nia,39 Newsom went ahead anyway, asserting that according to his 
understanding, the California Constitution guaranteed an equal pro-
tection of the laws and thus barred discrimination in such matters.40
 While some citizen groups opposed the initiative on rule of law 
grounds,41 the initial response of the California Attorney General’s 
office was more equivocal. When asked whether the marriage certif-
icates issued were legal, the response was “[w]e don’t know.”42 Pub-
lic reaction was also confused. The San Francisco Chronicle wrote 
that San Francisco “defied the law” and that it was an act of “civil 
36. By this I mean that for the outside observer it will often be difficult to perceive 
whether resistance is going on. At least in the outset, only the official knows she is resist-
ing, whereas others might think that the resistant interpretation is otherwise correct. 
 37. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 3, at 724. But see Oren Gross, Are Torture War-
rants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481 
(2004) (arguing that extreme and exceptional cases might require public officials to go be-
yond the legal order and accept the legal ramifications for their actions). 
38. Such resistance was often couched in the language of offering competing legal 
interpretations, but often it was expressed in language which refused to comply with Court 
decisions. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); ANDERSON, supra note 10; MARK V.
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT,
1936-1961, at 240 (1994); N.V. Bartley, Looking Back at Little Rock, 25. ARK. HIST. Q. 101 
(1966). 
39. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 300, 301, 308.5 (2003).  
40. Carolyn Marshall, Dozens of Gay Couples Marry in San Francisco Ceremonies,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A24.  
41. Id. (“Mathew D. Staver, president and general counsel of Liberty Counsel, the 
lawyers for the group that plans to sue, said the marriage certificates issued Thursday 
were ‘not worth the paper they are written on.’ He added that Mr. Newsom was ‘giving the 
impression that mayors are above the law.’ ”). 
42. Id.
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disobedience,”43 failing to note that San Francisco city officials are 
not exactly part of the “civil” in civil disobedience. San Francisco offi-
cials rested their claims with the California Constitution and other 
state court decisions, most notably Massachusetts, which held that 
barring gays and lesbians from marrying is discriminatory.44 They 
did this despite the California Constitution’s prohibition on adminis-
trative agencies from declaring state laws unconstitutional or unen-
forceable in the absence of an appellate court determination.45
 The events in San Francisco demonstrate how the desire to resist 
translates into various actions. In the beginning, apparently after 
hearing President George W. Bush’s State of the Union Address 
praising the Federal Defense of Marriage Act,46 Newsom decided to 
resist the law that prohibited same sex marriages in California, be-
lieving that the California Constitution (and the people of San Fran-
cisco, his constituents) was on his side.47 At the same time, it was ob-
vious to all involved, including Newsom, that by granting marriage 
permits he was resisting the California statute. Newsom took action 
by issuing marriage permits, relying on a legal move that in all like-
lihood he could not believe was tenable. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
of California ordered San Francisco to stop issuing marriage permits, 
holding that absent a declaration of unconstitutionality by an appel-
late court, San Francisco could not choose to disregard state stat-
utes.48 The substantive question, whether the statutes were unconsti-
tutional, was postponed to another day.49 After the 2004 decision, 
Newsom decided to acquiesce rather than maintain his noncompli-
ance by pursuing the matter further. He further decided not to con-
tinue issuing marriage permits, which, in light of the then exhaus-
tion of legal remedies, would have found him disobeying.50
43. Rachel Gordon, S.F. Defies Law, Marries Gays / Legal Battle Looms: City Hall 
Ceremonies Spur Constitutional Showdown, Injunction Threat, SFGATE (Feb. 13, 2004), 
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/S-F-defies-law-marries-gays-LEGAL-BATTLE-2823284.php. 
44. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
45. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5 (Deering, LexisNexis through 2013 Supplement). 
46. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
47. EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW
SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 227-28 (2010). 
48. Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 499 (Cal. 2004). 
49. In 2008, the California Supreme Court held that 
the right to marry, as embodied in article I, sections 1 and 7 of the California 
Constitution, guarantees same-sex couples the same substantive constitutional 
rights as opposite-sex couples to choose one’s life partner and enter with that 
person into a committed, officially recognized, and protected family relationship 
that enjoys all of the constitutionally based incidents of marriage. 
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 433-34 (Cal. 2008).  
50. As is well known, California voters then passed “Proposition 8,” which reverted  
to the situation ex ante. Since litigation is still going on, it remains to be seen what will 
2013]                 DISSENTING FROM WITHIN 613 
 Another story brings these tensions even more sharply into focus. 
In the nineteenth century, land titles in Kentucky were in disarray, 
owing to “notorious land distribution schemes.”51 At the same time, 
the federal government wanted to sell land in the West to specula-
tors. Local residents who lived near the parcels resisted this, because 
they wanted the land for themselves and their communities.52 To 
combat the federal plans, local residents resorted to squatting on the 
federal lands. The local governments, who wanted to support the ille-
gal squatters, enacted laws that made it easier for squatters to dis-
possess private absentee owners (those who got the land from the 
federal government).53 State courts also assisted squatters against 
the plans of the federal government.54
 Under the 1792 Virginia-Kentucky Compact, which established 
the state of Kentucky from lands previously owned by Virginia, land 
titles were to be “determined only by the laws of the State under 
which they are acquired,” meaning Virginia’s.55 Displeased with fed-
eral designs and with its haphazard land schemes, Kentucky enacted 
its own version of occupying claimant laws, which basically extended 
to squatters (those without color of title) the statutory protection af-
forded to untitled settlers with color of title.56 This meant that eject-
ed squatters would have to be compensated for improvements and 
crops. Kentucky courts routinely upheld this protection, but the Su-
preme Court, in Green v. Biddle,57 held the law unconstitutional as a 
violation of the Contracts Clause. The decision was met with severe 
opposition led by Kentucky’s two senators, Henry Clay and Richard 
Johnson.58 Clay requested a rehearing, which was granted, but to no 
avail. The new decision upheld the original decision.59
 Even before the second Green decision there was widespread offi-
cial resistance. The Kentucky House declared the decision to be a 
“hoax” and defended the invalidated Kentucky laws.60 Senator Rich-
ard Johnson went as far as to propose a constitutional amendment 
happen. Recently, the 9th Circuit decided that the ban on same sex marriages is unconsti-
tutional. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
786 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144). 
51. The following account draws on DWIGHT WILEY JESSUP, REACTION AND ACCOM-
MODATION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 1809-1835, at 
213-31 (1987). 
52. PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 47.
53. For examples, see id. at 60-62. 
54. Id. at 61. 
 55. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 12 (1823). 
56  . JESSUP, supra note 51, at 215. 
57. Green, 21 U.S. at 12. 
58. JESSUP, supra note 51, at 217-18.
59. Id. at 219-20. 
60. Id. at 217. 
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that in cases of a judicial controversy the Senate shall have appellate 
jurisdiction, denouncing the Supreme Court as “an ‘irresponsible’ 
federal agency enlarging national power at the expense of state sov-
ereignty.”61 Things were not helped by the second Green decision. 
Kentucky continued to resist and enforced its invalidated statutes. 
Kentucky courts routinely ignored Green and continued to enforce 
the invalidated state law, holding it as consistent with both the Vir-
ginia Compact and the Federal Constitution.62 In time, the federal 
government came around. Unlike today, nineteenth century Ameri-
can bureaucracy possessed little enforcement resources, making re-
sistance by local officials much easier. Realizing it could not protect 
absentee owners and speculators, the federal government legalized 
what was previously illegal by changing federal laws, “shifting from 
the use of public land for revenue and toward the direct distribution 
of land to actual settlers.”63 This culminated with the 1862 Home-
stead Act, which provided free acquisition of land by those who lived 
on the land for five years and improved it.64
 Similar to San Francisco, Kentucky attempted to offer a legal in-
terpretation of the relevant texts. However, unlike San Francisco, 
when Kentucky’s interpretation was denied in the Supreme Court, and 
the Kentucky statutes invalidated, state officials chose not to acqui-
esce, but escalated their attack to full-fledged defiance. These two ex-
amples hint at the why and how of official resistance. But now a deep-
er explanation is required, one that goes to the heart of the legal system 
and seeks to understand why such cases happen and will inevitably 
continue to happen.
III. WHAT MAKES OFFICIAL RESISTANCE POSSIBLE?
 Two factors explain resistance on both the individual level (con-
flict between the rule of law and human agency) and the institutional 
level (instability of hierarchy, resistance to change, and institutional 
identity). As I argue at length below, resistance exists partly because 
the very mechanisms that are otherwise instituted to induce compli-
ance are the ones that render resistance possible.   
 To be sure, there are many varieties of official resistance. Re-
sistance by administrative agencies to court decisions is different 
from resistance of mayors to the same. Resistance by cities to state 
statutes is different from resistance by states to federal statutes. And 
61. Id. at 218-19. 
62. PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 47, at 61. See, e.g., Bodley v. Gaither, 19 Ky. (3 
T.B. Mon.) 57, 59 (1825), cited in JESSUP, supra note 51, at 222. 
 63. PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 47, at 62-63. 
 64. See Act of May 20, 1862 (Homestead Act), Pub. L. No. 37-64, § 392 (repealed 1976). 
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all of those are different from lower court resistance to the Supreme 
Court.65 In each case, it matters who is resisting and toward what 
end. I do not slight such important distinctions. And yet, at a suffi-
cient level of abstraction, there are commonalities such that the 
overall category of official resistance is useful to keep in mind, even if 
it varies from institution to institution and is motivated by different 
concerns, incentivized differently across institutions, and deployed in 
different ways.66 Developing a unified category, then, makes dispar-
ate practices that are a salient feature of official behavior intelligible 
and, as such, it gives us greater insights into the causes and effects of 
social practices that have legal significance.
 This Part will shed light on two sets of arguments that seek to ex-
plain what makes official resistance possible. By this I mean, what 
are the causes that provide the space for such behavior rather than 
the particular reasons an official resists. Officials might resist be-
cause they stand to gain from resistance, such as political or reputa-
tional capital, or because resistance makes their job easier in some 
way. This is not the question that I am asking. Instead, I am con-
cerned with what renders resistance possible; what is it about the 
legal system that enables resistance to come forward and assume a 
place in the repertoire of official behavior?
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, officials resist the law because they can. 
Lest this seem simplistic, let us break the argument into two parts. 
The first argument is that there are inherent and irresolvable ten-
sions between the ideal of the rule of law and the fact of human 
agency, which make official resistance unavoidable. The rule of law 
asks officials to put aside their notions of right and wrong and to act 
according to the rules enacted by others.67 In other words, it demands 
supremacy.68 But the rule of law (like any rule) is not self-applying. 
Officials must mediate between the law and government actions. Of-
ficials, however, have agency. They have their own preferences to 
65. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on 
Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297 (1990) (suggesting that resistance by federal courts to Supreme 
Court decisions is less than that of state courts to the same); see also Walter F. Murphy, 
Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1017, 1022 (1959) 
(arguing that federal court defiance is less likely than state). 
66. See Baum, supra note 5 (arguing that the bifurcation that separates the imple-
mentation of legislative policies from judicial policies works against the development of a 
general understanding of policy implementation).  
67. There are rare exceptions to this rule, such as in the case of a patently unconstitu-
tional law. See Robert G. Vaughn, Public Employees and the Right to Disobey, 29 HASTINGS 
L.J. 261 (1977). 
68. The demand of supremacy does not stem from the idea that the rule of law is itself 
an ideal, but rather because obedience is thought to be the best instrument of achieving the 
goals the law wants to pursue. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW
AND MORALITY 229 (1979). 
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further, and those may come into tension with the rule of law. More-
over, that tension is pervasive and goes all the way down. This is be-
cause, as I argued above, public officials have a role conception not 
just of automatons, but also as those instilled with fulfilling some type 
of public goal, one that may come into conflict with the rule of law.  
 The second argument concerns institutional design. It speaks to 
the design of governmental structures, mainly, but not only, bureau-
cracies, which renders resistance possible and inevitable. This argu-
ment is broad, so I will break it down to several components. Alt-
hough my two overarching arguments (rule of law and institutional 
design) are freestanding, they often work together. For example, an 
agency official will find herself as part of a hierarchical organization 
but also endowed with human agency. The way the two interact gen-
erates the particular type of resistance discussed in Part IV. 
A.   The Argument from the Rule of Law
 Law is a system that exercises authority on individuals and insti-
tutions alike.69 Moreover, law aspires to exercise the most power on 
those who are directly subordinate to it and are in charge of imple-
menting its demands, i.e. public officials. Public officials get paid to 
do what the law requires; they are rewarded with financial benefits, 
and enjoy institutional esteem and prestige. Thus, it would seem that 
there is a strong, if not the strongest, incentive to comply with the 
law, with the directives of superior officials and those of superior in-
stitutions.70 Why, then, does official resistance happen? 
 There are many explanations as to why public officials might 
choose to disregard the law. Divergent policy preferences among gov-
ernmental units play a large role in explaining resistance. Moreover, 
if officials and institutions disagree with a certain policy and think 
they can resist it and also escape sanctions, resistance becomes more 
likely.71 Still, such explanations fail to capture what makes all of this 
69. Id. passim (discussing the meaning of law’s claim to authority); JOHN AUSTIN, THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 6-8 (1832) (introducing the command theory of 
law); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) (criticizing Austin). Note, 
however, that even when taking into account Hart’s “power-conferring rules,” law is still a 
system that exercises authority. On the Hartian version, people elect to comply with the 
power-conferring rules precisely because doing so bestows legal validity on their actions. Id.
70. ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGAR-
CHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 189 (Eden & Cedar Paul trans., Transaction 
Publishers 1999) (1915) (arguing that the bureaucracy is staffed by an “army of slaves who 
are always ready, in part from class egoism, in part for personal motives . . . , to undertake 
the defense of the state which provides them with bread”). 
71. This is the rational choice perspective. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECO-
NOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) [hereinafter DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY]; AN-
THONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967) [hereinafter DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY];
James F. Spriggs, II, Explaining Federal Bureaucratic Compliance with Supreme Court 
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possible in the first place. Conceptually, the fact that a subordinate 
unit of government thinks differently than its superiors should not 
matter at all. Once the policy has been determined and promulgated, 
dialogue ends and implementation begins. Indeed, the rule of law ex-
ists precisely to preclude the possibility of official resistance. 
 Although the idea of the rule of law is contested,72 there is some 
consensus among scholars.73 Namely, the state and its officials are 
limited by law. Laws must be complied with not only by their sub-
jects but also by those that make them or enforce them, until they 
are changed, and only then through the proper procedures. Laws 
must have certain characteristics for them to be valid. They must be 
general, applied equally, and certain. The idea animating this theme 
is one of predictability. Laws must be able to guide behavior, and 
people have a right to expect that law will remain certain, stable, and 
predictable, so that they can plan their actions.74 Finally, the rule of 
law is understood in contradistinction with the rule of man.75 A socie-
ty governed by the rule of law should not be subject to the arbitrary 
whims of government and its officials.  
 Official resistance, then, flies in the face of this understanding. 
Resisting officials have a good idea what the law is, and, despite that, 
choose to act differently. Moreover, official resistance undermines the 
ideals of certainty and predictability, thus frustrating legitimate ex-
pectations. Although resistance is pervasive, suggesting that it is 
both certain and predictable, the reality is that it will be practiced in 
a more ad-hoc manner, making it difficult, if not impossible, to pre-
dict when and where it will happen. Finally, the very idea of official 
resistance advances the rule of man rather than the rule of law. 
Through the act of resistance, officials express their own preferences 
and expose their own biases—exactly what the rule of law is supposed 
to guard against. 
 Official resistance, however, is not only in tension with the rule of 
law. The rule of law itself contains an inherent and irresolvable ten-
Opinions, 50 POL. RES. Q. 567 (1997) [hereinafter Spriggs, Bureaucratic Compliance] (argu-
ing that agencies comply based on the costs and benefits of alternative ways of responding 
to court decisions and that, although compliance is the norm, agencies also act in self-
interested ways); James F. Spriggs, II, The Supreme Court and Federal Administrative 
Agencies: A Resource-Based Theory and Analysis of Judicial Impact, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI.
1122 (1996) [hereinafter Spriggs, A Resource-Based Theory]. 
72. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND POLITICAL THINKERS 21 (Stanley 
Hoffman ed., 1998) (presenting a position, though not endorsing it, that “ ‘the Rule of Law’ 
has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use”); see also Jere-
my Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 LAW &
PHIL. 137, 137-38 (2002). 
73. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 114-26 (2004). 
74. Id. at 119; see also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969). 
75. TAMANAHA, supra note 73, at 122. 
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sion with the fact of human agency, which renders official resistance 
possible. Thomas Hobbes was one of the first political theorists to 
point to the difficulty of a rule-governed society. As Jean Hampton, 
summarizing Hobbes’s position, writes: 
A rule is inherently powerless; it only takes on life if it is inter-
preted, applied, and enforced by individuals. That set of human be-
ings that has final say over what the rules are, how they should be 
applied, and how they should be enforced has ultimate control over 
what these rules actually are. So human beings control the rules,
and not vice versa.76
 Hobbes advances two arguments. One is that rules are indetermi-
nate. They require interpretation, and different people will interpret 
them differently. One solution to this problem is the creation of a ju-
diciary—setting up an institution that is entrusted with saying what 
the law is. This is Brian Tamanaha’s solution.77 There are numerous 
problems here,78 but mostly this solution is not sufficiently sensitive 
to the second argument derived from Hobbes, which is that rules will 
not always be able to limit the behavior of officials as a matter of fact. 
Contrary to the assumption of the rule of law, power cannot be effec-
tively constrained by rules.79 This is independent from the concern 
over how rules should be interpreted, since even consensus on a 
rule’s meaning cannot guarantee compliance. Indeed, given the ac-
count of official resistance in Part II, the official is engaged in an ac-
tivity against law, despite her knowing what the law entails. Of 
course, having a court tell the official what to do might steer the offi-
cial away from resistance, but that cannot be guaranteed for two rea-
sons. First, the official might disregard what the court ordered her to 
do.80 Second, many issues are simply not litigated.81 Be it for lack of 
standing, conflicts where the actors do not want to involve the courts, 
76. Jean Hampton, Democracy and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 13, 16 (Ian 
Shapiro ed., 1994). 
77. TAMANAHA, supra note 73, at 123-24. Tamanaha admits that this creates a further 
problem, which is rule by judges. Thus, he counsels careful selection of judges, though it is 
not clear how that obviates the concern. 
78. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIÈCLE) (1997) 
(arguing that the task of adjudication is strategic and ideological and that adjudication 
serves to entrench the power of the social and economic elites).  
79. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF 
SOCIAL THEORY 179-80 (1976) (stating that rules can ensure the impersonality of adminis-
trative power only if there were a way to divine their meaning independent of the adminis-
trator’s preferences, but this is impossible).  
80. The chances of her doing that are slim, but not zero. See ROBERT J. HUME, 3 HOW 
COURTS IMPACT FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 77 (2009). Moreover, officials and 
institutions may be able to disregard a court decision without openly declaring so. See infra 
Part IV.   
81. Indeed, only a fraction of people with claims sue. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore 
Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 136 (2002). 
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or lack of knowledge that resistance is going on, most issues will be 
settled outside courts, utilizing either intra-organizational or inter-
organizational tools, or through politics. It would seem, then, that offi-
cials find themselves in the following predicament. On the one hand, 
they view their task as (primarily) complying with law’s demands. On 
the other hand, they have their own rule conceptions to further and 
the interpretive capacity (deriving from the indeterminacy of lan-
guage or from the shortcomings of oversight mechanisms) to do so. 
 This tension appears every time the official realizes she needs to 
do something she might not want to do. True, in most cases the sense 
of duty and the need for job security will override the desire to resist. 
More importantly, the official’s identification with her role and the 
surrounding institutional ethos will tend to enmesh her in the insti-
tutional logic to an extent that she might suspend independent moral 
thinking, happily doing what her superiors order her to.82 In other 
words, the official complies with the law simply because it is the law, 
independent of any substantive consideration about the merits of the 
particular policy the law embodies.83 But recall that officials also 
have a unique role conception. They do not view themselves merely 
as automatons but also as instilled with fulfilling some type of public 
goal, one that may, though not necessarily, come into conflict with 
the rule of law.84 Therefore, when official resistance occurs, this 
means that the law does not operate as a constraint that excludes the 
consideration of other factors. The success of the regulatory system 
thus becomes dependent on the officials who administer it. So let us 
now turn to the institutions where these officials work.  
82. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 
(1974); Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL.
371 (1963). For a powerful formulation of the thesis that evils are often carried out not by 
evil persons but by people who accept the authority of the state and act based on its orders, 
see HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (rev. 
& enlarged ed. 1965). See also Martha Minow, Living Up to Rules: Holding Soldiers Re-
sponsible for Abusive Conduct and the Dilemma of the Superior Orders Defence, 52 MCGILL 
L.J. 1, 8 (2007).
83. This is what Schauer calls a content-independent reason. See Frederick Schauer, 
Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1936-37 (2008) (“[W]e think of authority as 
content-independent precisely because it is the source and not the content of the directive 
that produces the reasons for following it.”). 
84. A possible objection would be that part of the role conception of the public official 
is to comply with the law. This is true, but this demand will never be an absolutely overrid-
ing concern. Another objection would be that the law is the instrument informing the offi-
cial about her overall role, so taking cues from the law is what an official does. This is true, 
but, again, only to an extent. Officials will have other sources, derived from institutional 
culture, personal beliefs, and social mores, which inform their decisions.   
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B.   The Argument from Institutional Design 
 Even if one accepts the preceding argument about the conflict  
between the rule of law and human agency, one can still object and 
ask: Aren’t governmental institutions designed with the purpose of 
making sure that dissent from within does not occur? More specifical-
ly, doesn’t governmental hierarchy preclude instances of official re-
sistance? After all, don’t officials want to keep their jobs? Indeed, one 
can accept the preceding argument about the inevitable fact of human 
agency, but add that human agency within government is always con-
strained, and thus in governmental settings law will either operate as 
a content-independent reason to perform an action or hierarchical 
structures will produce compliance. To see why this argument is, at 
best, incomplete, let us break it in two: the problem of hierarchy and 
the problem of resistance to change and institutional identity. 
1.   The Problem of Hierarchy 
 A central feature of the modern administrative state is its hierar-
chical structure. Hierarchies ensure that work gets done in an effi-
cient manner and serve as a means to control discretion within a 
role. Bureaucracies have hierarchical structures because they need to 
settle internal conflicts that inevitably arise in every large organiza-
tion and because they require efficient communication inside the or-
ganization.85 The purpose of hierarchy, then, is specialization, coordi-
nation, and control. Yet hierarchy is not a safeguard against internal 
dissent. Governmental structures are not always tightly hierarchical. 
There can be multiple hierarchies that overlap in confusing and 
sometimes unpredictable ways which, due to conflicting priorities, 
create problems of coherence, coordination and control.86 More im-
portantly, hierarchy alone cannot guarantee compliance. Of course, 
hierarchy can produce some compliance. Robert Michels, for example, 
famously argued that all forms of bureaucratic organization eventu-
ally become oligarchies.87 In any bureaucracy, there will be leaders, 
those who are indispensible to the organization and who can best 
consolidate their interests and rule over others. In exchange for giv-
ing officials jobs and promotions, officials will be grateful and will do 
what the leaders demand.88 All large-scale societal organizations 
share a hierarchical rational-bureaucratic structure, and there will 
always be such organizations because society has an ever-increasing 
85. See DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY, supra note 71, at 50-56. 
86. JOHN R. SUTTON, LAW/SOCIETY: ORIGINS, INTERACTIONS, AND CHANGE 10 (2001) 
(“[F]ormal roles and hierarchies defined by law are not very useful for understanding 
everyday legal behavior.”). 
 87. MICHELS, supra note 70, at 189. 
88. Id. 
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need to administer its complex tasks efficiently. Since there is  
bureaucracy, some group of people must manage it; thus, power is 
transferred to them, leading to its monopolization.89 Once that hap-
pens, the powerful group will seek to preserve and entrench their 
status, even if that runs counter to larger societal interests.90
 Although this argument has attracted a great deal of criticism,91 I 
will argue that hierarchies will never be able to completely eliminate 
official resistance.92 Hierarchy implies that an organization will be 
divided into units and subunits. They are integrated into the hierar-
chy but at the same time grow to be differentiated from it in terms of 
the tasks they perform and the resultant subinstitutional identities 
they develop. This intrainstitutional fragmentation renders resistance 
possible.93 As Matthew Smith argued elsewhere, hierarchical struc-
tures have limited capacity: 
[H]ierarchical structures can ensure at best only local agreement 
. . . This is because the “semantic guidance” officials receive . . .
will come primarily from immediate superiors. For there to be 
global agreement, there would have to be a continuous hierarchical 
chain of such semantic guidance, and such arrangements are 
highly unstable.  
. . . . 
. . . [M]ost large-scale legal institutions are composed of a large 
and heterogeneous group of officials. These officials may not have 
the same education, political commitments, and level of identifica-
tion with the institution within which they work. Thus it is likely 
that there will be a nonnegligible diversity in the beliefs among of-
ficials about what it is that they are doing.94
 Even this account may be overly optimistic. Smith argues that hi-
erarchical structures can ensure, at best, only “local agreement.” But 
 89. Monopolization occurs because managerial power is centralized up the chain of 
command, and is thus exercised by a few over the many. 
90. See Darcy K. Leach, The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy 
Across Organizational Forms, 23 SOC. THEORY 312, 313 (2005). 
91. Id. at 313-14 (citing sources). 
92. While alternative institutional structures that emphasize deliberation and partic-
ipation are possible, those have costs of their own and the tradeoff is not always clear. See
generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). For examples of critiques of 
such structures, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Nego-
tiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003) and David A. Super, Laboratories of 
Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 541 (2008).  
93. On the severability of institutions into components, see Richard H. Hall, Intraor-
ganizational Structural Variation: Application of the Bureaucratic Model, 7 ADMIN. SCI. Q.  
295 (1962).  
94. Matthew Noah Smith, The Law As a Social Practice: Are Shared Activities at the 
Foundation of Law?, 12 LEGAL THEORY 265, 287-88 (2006). 
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why should we assume that even that is possible? Of course local 
agreement exists, but it cannot be achieved one hundred percent of 
the time. Local agreement, therefore, is contingent upon rather than 
intrinsic to the institutional structure itself. In other words, no one 
ever knows everything about what is going on in the organization. 
 In this respect, consider the reality of bureaucratic life. Our domi-
nant vision of bureaucracy is influenced by Max Weber,95 who under-
stood society’s main goals to be efficiency, freedom, and fairness.96
Consequently, the optimal way of societal organization, per Weber, 
was the separation of lawmaking (politics) from law application (bu-
reaucracy).97 The bureaucracy, insulated from politics, is best suited 
to implement the state’s policies by being formally rationalized. For-
mality is the level of insulation of law from external societal factors.98
Rationality is law’s ability to be implemented uniformly, to treat like 
cases alike.99 Thus, bureaucracy rests on general rules and procedures, 
impersonality, hierarchical order, predictability, employs ends-means 
calculi, and applies equally to all.100
 And yet, the notion that formal rationality is the defining feature 
of bureaucracy underemphasizes the organizational problems that 
give rise to official resistance. Whereas Weber linked hierarchy with 
compliance, the myriad principal-agent problems in administrative 
agencies cast doubt on this proposition.101 Consider that rules have to 
be given by the top and implemented by subordinates. But language 
is imprecise and resources will be limited for the top to convey exact-
ly what it wants the official to do. Of course, as is often the case with 
rules, they will be either overinclusive or underinclusive, or both, 
which might give the public official sufficient latitude for resistance. 
Thus, as orders travel through the organization, they will inevitably 
be distorted.102 Close supervision may be able to alleviate this prob-
lem, but in bureaucracies, “each level of the hierarchy receives a pro-
gressively narrower range of information regarding matters within 
95. See, e.g., FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196-264 (H.H. Gerth & C. 
Wright Mills eds., 1946). 
96. William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 
YALE L.J. 1198, 1225 (1983). 
 97. 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 653-58 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich  
eds., 1978). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
100. MATHIEU DEFLEM, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: VISIONS OF A SCHOLARLY TRADITION
43-46 (2008). 
101. For an elaboration on these problems, see Simon, supra note 96, at 1226-36. 
102. For examples of the problems of over and underinclusiveness, see FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECI-
SION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991) and Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 
CALIF. L. REV. 953, 992-93 (1995). For a discussion regarding the distortive effect of prob-
lems of communication, see DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY, supra note 71, at 77-78.  
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the control of its subordinates.”103 Supervision exists, but given time, 
institutional, and informational constraints, it is rarely at a level 
which will optimally monitor the behavior of subordinate officials. 
Consequently, supervising institutions may be severely limited in 
their ability to control the implementation of their policies. Moreover, 
even if sufficient information flows to agency heads, there are rea-
sons why they may choose not to act on cases of resistance, either be-
cause resistance gets drowned out due to information overload or be-
cause leaders would rather not know what is going on in order to 
avoid penalties.104 All of this makes officials more sensitive to activi-
ties that are more easily reviewable while neglecting their other du-
ties, even if those are more consonant with the agency’s overall 
goals.105 Finally, officials may be alienated from their work. The rou-
tine, the workload, and the constant lack of resources can cause offi-
cials to shirk their duties, but also to engage in “ritualistic compli-
ance,” which is symbolic but not substantive.106
 A possible solution to these problems is for managers to organize 
the incentive structure so as to increase compliance and supervi-
sion.107 Such solutions, however, fail where the official’s actions can-
not be supervised by the manager or where outputs are difficult to 
measure, a common situation in bureaucracies. Bureaucrats often 
face conflicting goals and answer to managers from different institu-
tions, making compliance particularly challenging.   
 Finally, there is an inherent tension between rules and hierarchy. 
The rule of law insists that the sovereign’s will be expressed as rules. 
This precludes the sovereign from personally enforcing the rules, so 
as to prevent ad hoc decisionism and arbitrariness. However, hierar-
chy requires that enforcers comply with the will of the sovereign, 
which suggests that the sovereign should participate in the enforce-
ment of the rules, especially since communication problems prevent 
the rules from fully expressing the sovereign’s will. These conflicting 
impulses demonstrate the problem with the notion of legality, which 
views law as both constraining and extending the power of the sover-
eign. Bureaucracies purport to limit discretion through hierarchy, 
but they also purport to limit discretion through rules, thus making 
103. Simon, supra note 96, at 1233. 
104. See HERBERT KAUFMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE FEEDBACK: MONITORING SUBORDINATES’
BEHAVIOR 55-58, 65-66 (1973). 
105. See id.
106. For some implications of worker alienation for public officials, see MICHAEL LIPSKY,
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 79-80 (1980). 
107. See, e.g., KAUFMAN supra note 104, at 72-78 (recommending such changes); 
JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO
IT 154-75 (1989). 
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it possible for bureaucrats to appeal beyond their superiors to the 
rules, and vice versa.108
 The case of Harley v. Schuylkill County demonstrates this tension.109
Harley, a prison guard, refused to have a prisoner “stand check” in 
front of his cell, contrary to an order he received from the warden.110
Upon examining the prisoner, Harley discovered that he had been 
beaten, and believed that “dragg[ing] him from his cell . . . to stand 
check” would infringe on the prisoner’s constitutional rights, because 
force would have to be used.111 Harley was subsequently fired, only to 
have a court accept his claims, determining that there is a constitution-
al right to refuse to violate another’s federal constitutional rights.112
 Here the public official—in this case the prison guard—was un-
der a conflicting set of orders. Under the rule of organizational hi-
erarchy, he had to comply with the warden’s instructions. But un-
der substantive law, he believed the order was illegal. Thus, he ap-
pealed beyond hierarchy to the rules. Of course, the situation could 
have been reversed—complying with hierarchy contrary to substan-
tive rules. Resistance then, whether to the order or the Constitution, 
was inevitable.113
 Presumably, the remedy to these problems is the idea of the rule of 
law. But in light of the tension between the rule of law and human 
agency, the rule of law is itself problematic and, to an extent, anachro-
nistic.114 While the rule of law is intended to achieve coordination, offi-
cial action makes that coordination more complicated.115 As rules be-
come more complex, political controversy and fragmentation increases. 
As a result, synchronization, legal certainty, and stability decline.116
108. Simon, supra note 96, at 1235; see also James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen, A
Theory of Gradual Institutional Change, in EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMBIGUI-
TY, AGENCY, AND POWER 1 (James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010) (discussing the 
problem of rules that are applied by actors other than the designers).  
109. 476 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
 110. Id. at 192-93. 
 111. Id. at 193. 
 112. Id. at 193-94. 
 113. See also Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47 (1983) (arguing that the choice to obey the Constitution 
or a statute inevitably entails an act of obedience to one and disobedience to the other).  
114. PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD 
RESPONSIVE LAW  (1978).   
115. William E. Scheuerman, Democratic Experimentalism or Capitalist Synchroniza-
tion?: Critical Reflections on Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 17 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRU-
DENCE 101, 102 (2004). 
116. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001);
see also NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 114, at 93-95, 102-03 (arguing that the diffusion of 
legal authority and the rise of the administrative state bring about a withering away of the 
state). In such multiplicity of institutions, the idea of public interest loses its meaning; 
each institution serves a different constituency. Id. 
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2.   The Problem of Resistance to Change and Institutional Identity 
 The previous section discussed the problem of intra-institutional
resistance in the context of hierarchy. However, institutions are not 
stand-alone entities. They operate in a complex web of state and fed-
eral institutional interactions that is only partly defined by hierar-
chy. Resistance, then, is also an inter-institutional phenomenon. Just 
as there are internal agency problems with subordinates resisting 
their superiors, there are conflicts between governmental institu-
tions. If there are problems achieving compliance within a specific 
institution, it stands to reason that there will be problems achieving 
compliance in the overall governmental scheme. The problems linked 
to hierarchy are thus reproduced on an inter-institutional level.  
 Consider, for example, the problem of supervision. Congress au-
thorizes the establishment of administrative agencies, appropriates 
funds, sets mandates, and supervises their ongoing work, making 
sure they meet legislative goals. But with the rising number of ad-
ministrative agencies, an already busy Congress cannot supervise all 
agencies all the time. As a result, congresspersons tend to prefer a 
less centralized model of supervision by relying more on independent 
actions by citizens and interest groups who alert them to alleged  
violations.117 Either model of supervision—centralized or decentral-
ized—cannot achieve complete control. With the centralized model, 
Congress is bound to miss a significant chunk of agency action, simp-
ly because it can only examine a small sample. With the decentral-
ized model, the types of violations that will be detected are those 
which constituents and interest groups care about, which, again, are 
far from the entire gamut and are not necessarily coextensive with  
congressional goals.
 Two complementary features of inter-institutional interaction also 
facilitate resistance: resistance to change and assertion of institu-
tional identity. In every organization, an informal institutional struc-
ture develops alongside a formal one. An informal structure is de-
fined as “ ‘the aggregate of the personal contacts and interactions,’ 
. . . which do not have common or joint purposes and which are, in 
fact, ‘indefinite and rather structureless.’ ”118 The informal processes 
117. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984) (arguing that congression-
al oversight is best described not as a centralized policing model, but as a “fire alarm” mod-
el that depends on “alerts” by constituents and groups); see also Donald R. Songer et al., 
The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court 
Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 693 (1994) (finding evidence that litigants perform a 
similar fire alarm role in the judicial system).  
118. Philip Selznick, An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy, 8 AM. SOC. REV. 47, 47 
(1943); see also EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE 
AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP (1998) (examining the use of informal agency 
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facilitate resistance to change because they modify the way the insti-
tution operates, even to the point of changing its goals. Although the 
informal structure is not consciously produced, it is binding none-
theless. Informal structures can manifest themselves in solidarity 
and prestige construction but also in protection from outside inter-
ference, exhibiting a strong resistance to change.119 This means that 
organizations “will be poorly adapted to perform tasks that are not 
defined as part of that culture.”120 As bureaucratic structures become 
more professionalized and expert-based, officials get used to and 
want more independence and the freedom to work without excessive  
external constraints.121
 Resistance to change is also a result of institutional inertia. Insti-
tutional practices follow a significant investment in time, resources, 
and efforts, which constitute a “sunk cost” and lead to path depend-
ence.122 Implementing change means these costs will have to be re-
incurred. The greater the change, the more likely resistance be-
comes.123 Inertia among individuals also plays a role. For example, 
Dan Reiter suggests that 
Individuals’ knowledge structures tend to acquire inertia, such 
that beliefs tend to persevere through reception of new, discrepant 
information. Similarly, organizations tend to develop collective in-
terpretations of history, which acquire the status of myth within 
the organization and can be very resistant to change. For both in-
dividuals and organizations, often only a crisis or significant expe-
rience can overcome this inertia and form a new belief.124
 Organizational culture thus accounts for institutional recalci-
trance in the face of change. When things have been done a certain 
way for a long time, changing course is difficult.125 Moreover, even if it 
appears that change has taken place, it may be symbolic or cosmetic, 
structures to achieve interagency collaboration). See generally HOWARD E. ALDRICH, OR-
GANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS (Stanford Univ. Press 2008) (1979). 
119. Selznick, supra note 118, at 47. 
120. WILSON, supra note 107, at 95.  
121. Id. at 153. 
122. On path dependence, see James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical Sociolo-
gy, 29 THEORY & SOC’Y 507 (2000) and Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, 
and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000). 
123. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY, supra note 71, at 195-96. For the proposition that 
administrative inertia makes deviating from a heavily invested course of action less likely, 
see Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents, Proto-
types, and Solutions, 9 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 48-55 (1987). 
124. Dan Reiter, Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the 
Past, 46 WORLD POL. 490, 494 (1994). 
125. Thus, substantial and comprehensive changes are less likely to be implemented 
compared with gradual and incremental reforms. See Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution 
Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 
259 (2008); Spriggs, Bureaucratic Compliance, supra note 71, at 572.
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with the old policy remaining the real practice.126 The overarching 
governmental scheme also affects resistance to change. For example, 
it matters which institutions are superior to the resistant institution. 
Each institution has different tools—legal and political—to ensure 
compliance and each institution exerts different levels of political 
power so that it is easier to resist weak institutions than strong ones. 
For example, scholars have pointed out that because courts have few 
mechanisms to supervise how agencies respond to their decisions, 
they have limited ability to guarantee compliance, at least when 
compared with legislatures.127 But not all courts are made the same. 
The Supreme Court is considered to have more power (real and sym-
bolic) than lower courts and state courts. Therefore, resistance to the 
Supreme Court is much lower than to lower federal courts and state 
courts.128 Another factor impacting resistance to change is whether 
the institution is a one-shot player or a repeat player in the courts. 
Government institutions tend to be repeat players when it comes to 
their interaction with courts. Resistance might harm future success in 
court, decreasing the incentives to resist. Here too, not all government 
agencies are made the same. Some are not repeat players, or are less 
often repeat players, which should impact resistance accordingly. 
 The preceding analysis presupposed that resistance to change is 
an institutional phenomenon. But institutions are comprised of indi-
viduals with preferences of their own, which may accompany institu-
tionalized resistance. Put differently, a general institutional re-
sistance to change reflects a personal resistance to change.  
 In a series of experiments conducted over the past fifteen years, 
political psychologists have identified a motivation to defend the sta-
tus quo. Termed “System Justification Theory” (SJT), they argue that 
people develop rationalizing stereotypes to “bolster the legitimacy of 
126. See, e.g., Barbara Bigelow & Melissa Middleton Stone, Why Don’t They Do What 
We Want? An Exploration of Organizational Responses to Institutional Pressures in Com-
munity Health Centers, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 183 (1995) (documenting symbolic compliance 
with governmental demands among nonprofit health centers); William H. Clune III & R.E. 
Lindquist, What “Implementation” Isn’t: Toward a General Framework for Implementation 
Research, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1044, 1064 (1981) (discussing symbolic cooptation).  
127. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); Baum, supra note 5. An exception to this is the 
spurt of institutional reform litigation during the second half of the 20th century, where 
courts closely monitored agency compliance with their decisions. Yet this litigation has be-
come rarer, mainly due to issues of institutional competence and legitimacy. See, e.g., John 
C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387 
(2007); Susan Poser, What’s a Judge to Do? Remedying the Remedy in Institutional Reform 
Litigation, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1307 (2004) (reviewing ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD,
DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003)). 
128. Spriggs, Bureaucratic Compliance, supra note 71, at 582 (finding that between 
1953 and 1990, no federal agency defied or evaded a Supreme Court ruling).  
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the prevailing system when it is threatened or attacked.”129 People 
develop adaptive mechanisms to “accommodate, internalize, and even 
rationalize, key features of their socially constructed environments, 
especially those features that are difficult or impossible to change.”130
SJT claims that the people who tend to be the most socio-economically 
disadvantaged are the least likely to engage in social reform because of 
their tendency to legitimize the system and its overall social arrange-
ments.131 Disadvantaged members have a need to reduce the disso-
nance associated with their low social position by justifying their suf-
fering and their participation in the system that results in their so-
cial position.132 By extension, we may think of classes of workers in 
governmental hierarchies. Those at the bottom who resent their posi-
tion and yet seek to justify their institutional location, versus those 
at the top who push for change.133
 This joins a more general point about uncertainty. People who 
have a high need to manage uncertainty are more likely to be con-
servative and adopt system-justifying ideologies. Since status quo 
arrangements are familiar and certain, justifying the status quo sat-
isfies the need for consistency and certainty.134 Similarly, uncertainty 
regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform may result 
in resistance to change and status quo bias.135
 The upshot of resistance to change is the development of an insti-
tutional identity or ideology. In organizational literature it is common 
to think of two sources of organizational commitment—instrumental 
commitment and affective commitment. Instrumental commitment 
describes the way compliance is achieved through a method of ex-
changes. The employee contributes her labor in exchange for induce-
ments provided by the organization. Affective commitment occurs 
when employees develop an attachment to the organization, driven by 
values and ideologies, which can be actualized through participation in 
129. See John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated 
Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL.
881, 890 (2004). 
130. Id. at 912 (emphasis omitted). 
 131. Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implica-
tions for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1131 (2006). 
132. Id.
133. This can cut both ways, in the sense that if people rationalize their position they 
will also be less likely to resist. Thus, this argument will probably apply when an institu-
tion is threatened from the outside.  
134. Blasi & Jost, supra note 131, at 1138.  
135. See Raquel Fernandez & Dani Rodrik, Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in 
the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, 5 AM. ECON. REV. 1146 (1991) (predicting 
that if gainers and losers cannot be identified ex ante, it would be difficult to garner politi-
cal support for the reform). Notably, this argument does not rely on another cause for re-
sistance, that of sunk costs in existing practice, but rather on the uncertainty resulting 
from the reform. Id.
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the organization.136 Employees who identify with their organization 
in turn contribute more, thus enhancing, and entrenching, the particu-
lar values and ideologies the organization stands for. Furthermore, 
organizations tend to draw people who are already predisposed to the 
institution’s goals and commitment. Thus, they not only adopt the or-
ganization’s values, but they also strengthen it with their own per-
sonal network of similar values. 
 In any organization, people develop and maintain a sense of iden-
tity, which is shaped by the group to which they belong and toward 
which they maintain a positive attitude, in the belief that the group 
values and respects them.137 Pride in a group leads to deference to its 
social rules, because people gain from deferring to group authority 
when their self-conception is tied up with the success of the group.138
But from this follow potential risks. Namely, identification with the 
organization’s ideology makes organizational change less likely. Sup-
port for the current order means support for the norms and underly-
ing values, thus increasing the likelihood of resistance to change. 
 Once particular practices become entrenched, pride and attach-
ment have coalesced to resist outside scrutiny and intervention.139
Outside intrusion in the form of an adverse court decision or a new 
regulatory policy might meet resistance because it conflicts with the 
institution’s identity, ideology, its sense of purpose, and its view of its 
own expertise in the field vis-à-vis other governmental institutions.  
 The behavior of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) dur-
ing the Reagan Administration demonstrates these points.140 Presi-
dent Reagan and his administration were hostile to EPA regulation 
efforts, essentially working to reduce the effort to stop pollution.141 At 
first, the Administration reorganized the EPA, fired personnel and ap-
pointed people responsive to the new presidential policy.142 In 1982, 
with the passing of a new budget, the operating budget was cut by 
 136. See Larry E. Penley & Sam Gould, Etzioni’s Model of Organizational Involvement: A 
Perspective for Understanding Commitment to Organizations, 9 J. ORG. BEHAV. 43, 44 (1988).   
137. Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Legitimacy of Institutions and 
Authorities, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY,
JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 416, 421 (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001). 
138. Id. at 424-25 (explaining how the official’s identity is constructed by the organiza-
tion where she works to the point of nonseverability between the official and the organiza-
tion for the purposes of finding liability). 
139. See Oliver James & Christopher Hood, Prisons: Varying Oversight and Mutuality, 
Much Tinkering, Limited Control, in CONTROLLING MODERN GOVERNMENT: VARIETY,
COMMONALITY, AND CHANGE 25, 30 (Christopher Hood et al. eds., 2004) (“[A]t the level of 
prison staff, as with other uniformed state services, mutuality has often taken the form of a 
‘canteen culture’ embracing one-for-all solidarity against outside scrutiny or criticism.”). 
140. See generally B. Dan Wood, Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean 
Air Enforcements, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213 (1988). 
141. Id. at 217. 
 142. Id. 
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24% and expenditures for air pollution monitoring declined by over 
42%, alongside a cut of 31% in clean air personnel.143
 Given a hostile administration and the most Republican Congress 
since the 1950s, one would expect EPA activity to go down considera-
bly.144 That happened, but only to an extent. In the year following 
Reagan’s inauguration, and before the passage of the 1982 budget, 
the EPA resisted the Administration by increasing environmental 
enforcement activity.145 In 1982, with slashed budgets and resources, 
enforcement activity did decline by about 23%.146 It was then that 
EPA officials started leaking information to the press, resulting in 
Congress calling EPA officials to testify more than seventy times 
about nonimplementation of the Clean Air Act between October 1981 
and July 1982.147 Eventually, this led to the resignation of Reagan-
appointed EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch in 1983.148 After the res-
ignation, and thanks to committed bureaucrats who stayed on from 
the Carter administration, there was a considerable jump in en-
forcement activity (50%), which even surpassed that of the previous 
Carter Administration.149 Facing a drastically reduced budget, the 
EPA diverted efforts to non-resource-intensive enforcement activity, 
moving from monitoring (detecting violations) to abatement activities 
(issuing notices and decrees).150 In this way the EPA adapted to the 
changed environment in which it was operating by seeking to either 
boost or maintain regulatory activity. 
 In conclusion, resistance to change that stems from a strong insti-
tutional identity casts doubt on the robustness of democratic hierar-
chical models, according to which a top elected official, such as the 
president (principal), can direct the bureaucracy (agent) to do what 
he wishes. The EPA (more or less) successfully maintained its policy 
preferences despite a hostile President. Hierarchy, then, is only par-
tially effective at inducing compliance and cabining resistance.   
IV. STRATEGIES OF OFFICIAL RESISTANCE
 Part III identified two factors, which, though not exhaustive, ex-
plain resistance on both the individual level (conflict between the rule 
of law and human agency) and the institutional level (instability of hi-
erarchy, resistance to change, and institutional identity). Resistance 
 143. Id. at 218. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. at 222-24. 
 146. Id. at 224. 
 147. Id. at 218-19. 
 148. Id. at 219. 
 149. Id. at 224. 
 150. Id. at 224-26. 
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exists partly because the very mechanisms that are instituted to in-
duce compliance are structurally susceptible to resistance. If official 
resistance is possible, and indeed inevitable, how is it instantiated? 
This is the focus of the present Part. Although there are many strat-
egies public officials deploy when they choose to resist the law, I will 
focus on those I believe to be the most salient.  
 The costs of full-blown, out in the open, disobedience can be high. 
Officials and institutions that openly defy the law will usually expect 
severe legal and political sanctions. Thus, we can expect official re-
sistance to take more covert forms.151 In the following pages, I provide 
a typology of resistant official behavior. Of course, the choice of strat-
egy will vary depending on the particular circumstances of each sce-
nario, the reason for resistance, the extant political climate, the an-
ticipated institutional reaction, and the particular tools officials pos-
sess in their toolkit. Thus, the typology does not suggest a linkage 
between strategy and situation. Since the range of situations is 
enormous, I believe it is preferable to highlight the types of strate-
gies, acknowledging that they can apply in a wide variety of contexts. 
Finally, many of the strategies below are not exclusive to official  
resistance. Similar behavior that lacks a subjective motivation to re-
sist will not be considered resistance, even if it appears to the outside 
observer as the same. 
A.   Defiance 
 The most blatant form of resistance is outright defiance. For the 
sake of simplicity, let us assume that a particular policy or rule has 
been declared unconstitutional or impermissible. Instead of changing 
course, the resisting official or institution decides to reject the verdict 
and continue as before. Despite the potentially high political  
costs associated with this behavior, defiance is not as uncommon as 
one might think. The aforementioned case of the Kentucky land laws  
is one example,152 but there are many others. Southern resistance  
to desegregation after Brown v. Board of Education is perhaps the 
most well-known.153
 After Brown, officials throughout the South sought ways to defy 
the decision. Some, such as Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus spoke 
out against desegregation, vowing to maintain segregated institu-
tions. The forgotten doctrine of interposition, according to which 
states have the right to protect themselves from federal intervention, 
151. JENS LEHNE, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS 265 (2004). 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 59-69. 
153. The extant literature on this is extensive. For an overview and discussion of 
Southern official resistance, see BARTLEY, supra note 10.  
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was revived.154 The Arkansas State Legislature amended the state 
constitution to oppose desegregation and passed a law that relieved 
children from mandatory attendance at desegregated schools.155 Oth-
er states followed suit, issuing statements of interposition, asserting 
the compact theory of the Union and vowing to maintain control over 
education as a matter of states’ rights. Four states—Alabama, Flori-
da, Mississippi, and Georgia—went even further and nullified the 
Court’s ruling.156 Municipalities and state legislatures enacted laws 
that sought to keep schools and other places segregated. Louisiana, 
for example, passed a constitutional amendment withdrawing its 
consent from suits involving state and local school officials.157 This 
was relatively easy and not particularly costly to do, whereas it was 
very costly for groups like the NAACP to fight every new law with 
litigation.158 This is why official resistance partly succeeded, at least 
until the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which empowered the 
Attorney General to file suit against resisting schools and allowed 
defunding any program or activity receiving federal funds that dis-
criminated based on race, color or national origin.159 States, munici-
palities, and institutions were then forced to comply, but attempts to 
defy Brown persisted for decades after the decision.160
 While this is not the place to analyze all the techniques deployed 
by Southern officials in their attempts to resist Brown, it is im-
portant to consider one explanation, which has an implication for of-
ficial resistance. Resistance to Brown was not only fueled by rabid 
segregationists. Of course, much of popular resistance to Brown in 
the South was based on racial prejudice. But when it came to public 
officials, the story was more complicated. Governor Faubus, for ex-
ample, was not a white supremacist. His stance on desegregation pri-
or to 1957 was relatively moderate compared with the more radical 
pro-segregation elements in Arkansas politics. Although in the be-
ginning he sought to avoid confrontation with federal authorities, 
Faubus was also a politician who wanted reelection and was pres-
154. Id. at 126-49. The doctrine of interposition dates back to the Kentucky and Virgin-
ia Resolutions of 1798 refusing to comply with the Alien and Sedition Acts. Under the doc-
trine, states have a right to “interpose” their sovereignty and come between the federal 
government and their people, thus thwarting federal will.  
 155. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 9 (1958). 
156. BARTLEY, supra note 10,  at 131-32 (discussing interposition resolutions in various  
southern states).  
157. Id. at 135. 
 158. ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 232 (arguing that states could exploit the state 
treasury, whereas blacks only had costly litigation at their disposal).  
 159. See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2012). 
160. See infra, Part IV.D (discussing outsourcing). 
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sured by political opponents,161 which explains the turn he made clos-
er to the 1957 Little Rock confrontation with the National Guard. 
Faubus’ white constituency was, by and large, pro-segregation. Alt-
hough Arkansas and other southern states were relative outliers na-
tionwide, segregation was popular in the South.162 The national mi-
norities were thus local majorities. Defiance, then, was partly fueled 
by Southern officials caring more about the expected sanctions from 
their constituency than sanctions imposed by the federal government. 
Bolstered by the local public, Southern officials could defy Brown at a 
relatively low cost, and in fact, for some, it made their political ca-
reers. By openly defying the Supreme Court and calling for preserv-
ing segregation, Southern politicians were voted into political offices 
to replace more moderate opponents.163 Of course, when federal troops 
were called in to Little Rock, and especially after federal funding  
was put in jeopardy, the balance changed and officials were forced to 
rethink their position.164
 Despite the salience of these events and their predominance in the 
collective memory (and the literature), there is nothing particularly 
unusual about officials catering to their own constituency, even at 
the cost of openly defying superior institutions. San Francisco’s deci-
sion to issue marriage permits for gay and lesbian couples cannot be 
divorced from the high rate of gays and lesbians and those favorable 
to their cause living in San Francisco. Similarly, numerous munici-
palities presumably catered to liberal constituencies when passing 
ordinances prohibiting city workers from cooperating with or assist-
ing investigators trying to carry out provisions of the Patriot Act.165
This type of local activism, reflecting local preferences over federal 
161. Accordingly, Faubus’ rejection of desegregation was based on his fear that violence 
would erupt, a claim unsupported by the evidence. See David Wallace, Orval Faubus: The 
Central Figure at Little Rock Central High School, 39 ARK. HIST. Q. 314 (1980). See general-
ly ROY REED, FAUBUS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN AMERICAN PRODIGAL (1997). 
162. See, e.g., BARTLEY, supra note 10, at 13 (citing statistics, according to which 64% 
of Southerners supported “strict segregation” while only 7% supported integration). 
 163. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash 
Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81, 82, 97-110 (1994). 
 164. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
165. Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Impact of Symbolic Action: Local Government Refusal 
to Comply with State and Federal Laws, Paper Presented at the American Political Science 
Association Annual Meeting, September 3-6, 2009 (unpublished paper) (on file with au-
thor) (stating that by 2009, some 407 municipalities passed resolutions that promised 
resistance if called upon to enforce the Act locally); Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark 
Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
1277, 1282 (2004).
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and state laws, and resistance to “outside” intervention, can be found 
in diverse areas such as gun control, healthcare, and immigration.166
B.   Nonacquiescence 
 A milder form of defiance, one which is primarily associated with 
agency-court interaction, is a strategy which has come to be known 
as agency nonacquiescence. This occurs when “an agency applies a 
court decision only to the parties who participated in the original liti-
gation, refusing to treat the case as binding precedent in subsequent 
proceedings.”167 The literature distinguishes between intercircuit 
nonacquiescence and intracircuit nonacquiescence. Intercircuit non-
acquiescence, which is more common and less problematic, occurs 
when an agency refuses to follow the decisions of a circuit court 
which does not review its decisions. Absent a definitive statement by 
Congress or the Supreme Court, the agency uses its discretion to de-
cide whether to apply an outside circuit court’s ruling in its jurisdic-
tion. This practice is fairly routine and has evinced little legal opposi-
tion. Sometimes it is used to provoke a circuit split. Sometimes the 
behavior is considered favorable, since it allows cases to percolate 
before making their way up the hierarchical chain of courts. But of-
ten the agency believes that a different court’s decision impinges on 
its role as the expert policymaker.168
 A different and more controversial case is intracircuit nonacquies-
cence.169 Here, the agency refuses to apply precedents to other cases 
arising in the same jurisdiction. In effect, the agency is telling the 
court that it refuses to acknowledge its power to set precedent in its 
own jurisdiction and insists on re-litigating similar cases before the 
circuit court or district courts in the same circuit. For example, dur-
ing the Reagan administration, the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) reviewed the status of the disabled and indigent receiving so-
cial security benefits. The review ended up terminating the benefits 
166. Young, supra note 165, at 1282; see, e.g., Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right 
Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
1373 (2006). 
167. HUME, supra note 80, at 92. 
168. Id. at 95. On the merits of jurisdictional multiplicity, see Robert M. Cover, The
Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 639 (1981); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habe-
as Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977). 
169. The following discussion draws on Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case 
Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1339 (1991); Matthew Diller & 
Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A 
Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990); Samuel Estreicher & Richard 
L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989); 
Samuel Figler, Executive Agency Nonacquiescence to Judicial Opinions, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1664 (1993). 
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of over 200,000 beneficiaries.170 Many sued, and various courts (dis-
trict and circuit) consistently held that the legal process resulting in 
the denial of benefits was inadequate. Still, the process continued 
uninterrupted (except for restoring the benefits of the particular peo-
ple who sued), while the Secretary for Health and Human Services ex-
plicitly directed agency personnel to follow agency standards instead of 
the courts’.171 In Finnegan v. Matthews172 and Patti v. Schweiker,173 the 
Ninth Circuit effectively expanded the number of disability beneficiar-
ies in the federal Supplemental Security Income program. The SSA 
resisted, and in a pair of policy statements explained that “The Social 
Security Administration (SSA) does not acquiesce in the court’s deci-
sion.”174 It further wrote that the “SSA believes that the court’s 
standard . . . would be impossible to administer and that the correct 
standard is [its own regulation] . . . SSA believes that this regulation 
is fully consistent with . . . Congressional intent.”175
 The practice of agency nonacquiescence has, by and large, been 
criticized by courts and scholars alike.176 Courts declared the practice 
a breakdown of the rule of law,177 a perversion of justice,178 and 
threatened contempt.179 Nonacquiescence became so severe and wide-
spread that Congress sought to intervene. During the consideration 
of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, the 
House version of the bill prohibited agency nonacquiescence in its 
entirety.180 The Senate version of the bill, though not barring nonac-
quiescence, mandated certain procedural safeguards when it was in-
voked.181 None of this mattered, however, because both of these pro-
visions in the bills were ultimately deleted in conference.182 However, 
as Estreicher and Revesz note, this was not a sanctioning of nonac-
quiescence. The conference report insisted that nonacquiescence is 
legitimate only when the agency has initiated steps to appeal to the 
170 William Wade Buzbee, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 582, 582 (1985).
171. Id.
172. 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981). 
173. 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 174. HUME, supra note 80, at 97. 
175. Id.
176. But see Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 169, at 718-35 (arguing that nonacquies-
cence is constitutional if the agency wants to achieve a uniform policy); see also Edwin 
Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 983 (1987) (arguing more gen-
erally that constitutional litigation should only be binding on the litigating parties).  
177. Ithaca Coll. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1980). 
178. Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1503 (9th Cir. 1984). 
179. HUME, supra note 80, at 93. 
 180. H.R. 3755, 98th Cong. (2d Sess. 1984). 
 181. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 169, at 704. 
 182. Id. 
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Supreme Court and recommended that the Secretary propose reme-
dial legislation to deal with the problem.183
 Agency nonacquiescence was not confined to the SSA. It posed a 
general problem in the interaction of courts and administrative agen-
cies.184 Recognizing this, Congress sought in 1997 to enact legislation 
to address the problem. This led to House Bill 1544, titled the “Federal 
Agency Compliance Act,” which stipulated, among other things, that 
[An agency] shall, in administering a statute, rule, regulation, pro-
gram, or policy within a judicial circuit, adhere to the existing 
precedent respecting the interpretation and application of such 
statute, rule, regulation, program, or policy, as established by the 
decisions of the United States court of appeals for that circuit. All 
officers and employees of an agency, including administrative law 
judges, shall adhere to such precedent.185
 The Bill passed the House, was referred to the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, but never passed because the session of the 105th 
Congress ended. It was reintroduced in the subsequent session, but 
never put to a vote.186
 Given the preceding discussion on the causes of official resistance, 
the institutional motivation to resist in these cases was understand-
able. The agencies resisted intervention by external institutions. It 
was important for them to effectuate what they perceived to be the 
best policy, formulated by their experts. Moreover, the costs of going 
back to court again and again using public funds, knowing that 
plaintiffs—especially poor SSA beneficiaries—would lack incentives 
to pursue expensive litigation, coupled with a supportive executive 
administration, made resistance attractive. Thus, agencies treated 
judicial opinions as political obstacles rather than binding directives 
to be overcome by tactical means: nonacquiescence, more litigation, 
different judges, and lobbying Congress to override judicial decisions. 
In a political structure where very few issues are actually decided by 
the Supreme Court, agencies (and the executive more generally) can 
bide a lot of time by resisting, hoping to eventually get their way.187
183. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 169, at 703-04. 
184. See Federal Agency Compliance Act: Hearing on H.R. 1544 Before the Subcomm. 
on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) 
(statement of Dan T. Coenen, J. Alton Hosch Professor, University of Georgia School of 
Law). The Federal Agency Compliance Act intended “to prevent Federal agencies from 
pursuing policies of unjustifiable nonacquiescence in, and relitigation of, precedents estab-
lished in the Federal judicial circuits.” Id. 
185. H.R. 1544, 105th Cong. (1997).  
186. Federal Agency Compliance Act, H.R. 1924, 106th Cong. (1999).   
187. KAGAN, supra note 116, at 171-72; see also Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter 
Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 738 (1992) (“[F]ailure to comply 
with, if not outright defiance of, judicial remedial orders is tolerated to a certain degree.”).  
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Moreover, the reluctance of current doctrine to hold particular offi-
cials rather than their organizations in contempt makes public offi-
cials further insulated from personally dealing with the consequences 
of their actions.188 Thus, the political structure renders official re-
sistance possible, even worthwhile. True, Congress eventually sought to 
address the phenomenon of agency nonacquiescence, but that was only 
in 1997, many years after its peak. And again, even that effort failed, 
whereas the policy that the SSA wanted to effectuate was realized.  
C.   Bulletproofing 
 Bulletproofing occurs when an institution attempts to immunize 
itself from judicial review. It can be achieved by setting up symbolic 
structures or by reenacting old policy. Essentially, the institution goes 
through the motions of behaving as a court would like it to behave, 
without having that behavior affect the outcome of the administrative 
process.189 Here, I use the term in a more expansive sense, referring 
to behavior by any institution or official in response to any superior 
legal order (not just from a court), which is meant to give the impres-
sion that that institution or official complies with the order, but in 
effect allows the institution or official to promote their own agenda.  
 This strategy is different from defiance and nonacquiescence, be-
cause on the surface there is compliance. It is only when probing 
deeper that one sees resistance, which means the cost of detection 
will be higher than in more overt cases.190 Presumably, then, this is 
one of the strategy’s benefits. If more resources are needed to expose 
this strategy, parties will be less inclined or capable of pursuing ac-
tion. From the viewpoint of the official or institution, compliance 
must be demonstrated in order to maintain legitimacy, which in turn 
minimizes law’s encroachment on their power.191 For example, in her 
study of the implementation of equal employment and affirmative 
action policies mandated by federal statutes, Lauren Edelman has 
found that “organizations are clearly more likely to create symbolic 
structures [such as affirmative action officers] that require fewer or-
ganizational resources and can more easily be decoupled from actual 
188. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 275-80 (1990) (holding that city coun-
cil members should be held in contempt for refusing to implement a consent decree only 
after contempt proceedings against the city proved unsuccessful).  
189. SIMON HALLIDAY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COMPLIANCE WITH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
63-64 (2004). 
190. In some cases we might want to say that there is compliance with the letter of the 
law but not with its spirit, or that the official complies with a plausible reading of the law 
while knowing that her interpretation is likely to be invalidated in a future court decision.  
191. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The 
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401, 1435-37 (1990).  
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practices,”192 so that substantive results which alleviate discrimina-
tion are not guaranteed. This happens because organizations want to 
create a visible commitment to law in order to maintain their legiti-
macy in the eyes of the public and other institutions, and a formal 
structure will always be more visible than the extant informal organ-
izational structure. The symbolic structure, then, is a gesture to pub-
lic opinion, social norms and the law. It operates as a shield against 
liability and regulatory monitoring.193
 Setting up symbolic structures is one way to bulletproof resistant 
behavior. Another strategy is to reenact an old policy after it was de-
clared impermissible, but in a way that will continue to secure the 
impermissible objectives. This happened, for example, in the Ken-
tucky land cases.194 It also occurred on a widespread level with myri-
ad voter qualification laws intended to bypass the Fifteenth Amend-
ment’s prohibition on race and color as a qualification for voting. 
Faced with a constitutional prohibition on racial discrimination in 
the context of voting, many states, especially in the South, instituted 
literacy tests, that, although were facially neutral, were adminis-
tered unequally by white officials, permitting illiterate whites to 
vote and denying literate blacks the right to vote. It was only in 
1965, after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965, that black disenfranchisement at the polls 
was dramatically curtailed.195
 Reenactments in the face of declarations of illegality were also 
popular in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education.196 Consider, 
for example, the case of Green v. County School Board of New Kent 
County.197 In a companion case to Brown, the statutory mandated 
segregation system in Virginia schools was held to be unconstitution-
al.198 Despite the ruling, Virginia resisted, enacting statutes authoriz-
192. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational 
Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1554 (1992) (arguing that lack of sensi-
tivity to the legal environment fosters a symbolic appearance of compliance without alter-
ing the underlying structure). This is especially noticeable when the legal requirements are 
ambiguous and the enforcement mechanisms are weak. Others have argued that when 
norms are formulated as rules and not as standards, compliance will be more forthcoming 
and more resilient to social norms that encourage noncompliance. See Yuval Feldman & 
Alon Harel, Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An Experimental 
Analysis of the Rule v. Standard Dilemma, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 81 (2008). 
193. Edelman, supra note 192, at 1542. 
 194. See supra Part II.B.2. 
195. See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY 
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000) (describing attempts by states to effectively 
deny voting rights for blacks between the late 19th century and mid 20th century).  
196. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
197. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
198. Brown, 347 U.S. at 483. 
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ing segregation, some of which were later struck down.199 One of 
these statutes, the Pupil Placement Act, divested local school boards 
of the authority to place students, transferring that authority to the 
State Pupil Placement Board, which automatically assigned each stu-
dent to the school she attended in the previous year, with few excep-
tions for first time enrollees.200 To be sure, this was a mildly disguised 
way of maintaining segregation, but following a legal challenge the 
school board switched to a “freedom of choice” plan in order to remain 
eligible for federal aid.201 The plan consisted of letting the students 
choose whether they want to go to the “white school” or the “negro 
school.” Those who failed to choose were assigned the school they at-
tended the previous year.202 No whites chose to go to the black school, 
and very few blacks chose to go to the white school, keeping the insti-
tutions segregated.203 In its ruling, the Court held that the freedom of 
choice plan was inconsistent with the Brown decisions by failing to 
transition to a “unitary, nonracial system” of public education.204
 It is worthwhile noting that in this and similar cases, bulletproof-
ing relies on a background norm in U.S. constitutional law: a viola-
tion of Equal Protection must have the government intentionally 
discriminating.205 Resistance strategies are thus available because 
intent is deduced from the circumstances. Under an alternative 
rule, in which unconstitutional discrimination is established based 
on disparate impact, regardless of intent, successful resistance would 
have been more difficult. Put differently, the constitutional norm  
facilitates resistance.
 Reenacting an illegal policy also causes delay. Sometimes, the de-
lay itself can meet the resisters’ objectives. First, it takes time to dis-
cover the new policy and its effects. Then, fighting the policy, wheth-
er through lobbying, legal action, or a public campaign, will be costly 
and time consuming. Meanwhile, constituents’ preferences might 
change, different judges will sit on the bench, or different politicians 
will be voting in the legislature. And by the time everything is said 
and done, and even if resistance fails, it is possible that the resist-
ers would have gotten what they set out to do, or at least be able to 
claim a partial victory. In the voting context, for example, even 
199. Green, 391 U.S. at 433 n.1. 
 200. Id. at 433-34. 
 201. Id. at 433. 
 202. Id. at 434. 
 203. Id. at 433. 
204. Id. at 441; see also Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Ed-
ucation, and American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 818 (2011) (discussing how “freedom 
of choice” plans were used by whites to bypass court-ordered racial desegregation). 
205. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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though literacy tests eventually disappeared, generations of blacks 
and other minorities were still denied their right to vote. 
D.   Outsourcing 
 Resistance by public officials can be risky. It attracts public criti-
cism and can result in severe opprobrium. One way to avoid harmful 
consequences is to outsource the resistance. If the official or institu-
tion can achieve a separation between the state and the organ that is 
resisting, then resistance can go on uninterrupted while avoiding the 
possible harmful costs of resistance.206 For example, if a state wants 
to engage in forbidden discrimination, it might outsource that activi-
ty to a private agency immune from judicial review due to the state 
action doctrine. During the desegregation battles, for example, there 
was a plan to lease Central High School to a private school so that 
the state would not be forced to integrate.207 Since private schools are 
not subject to constitutional judicial review, segregation would have 
continued, thus frustrating Brown and its progeny. 
 Outsourcing is perhaps most familiar from the school desegrega-
tion context, but it has been used elsewhere. For example, the Harris 
County Courthouse cafeteria in Texas attempted to lease the facili-
ties to a private agency that would bar blacks from being served; the 
Fifth Circuit enjoined it from doing so.208 Similarly, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that leasing a state park to a private entity that would have 
maintained a segregated park was impermissible.209
 The best example, however, was the use of “white primaries” to 
deny blacks the ability to participate in party primaries. In the 
“white primary cases,” the Supreme Court confronted outsourced re-
sistance, eventually overcoming it only in Smith v. Allwright.210 In 
the first case, Nixon v. Herndon,211 the Court invalidated a Texas 
statute barring black participation in party primaries.212 The Court 
had no problem finding state action, because the discrimination was 
206. Of course, sometimes the official would like to take credit for resisting a superior 
decision. In these cases outsourcing will be less appealing because political capital is at stake. 
207. ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 154, 159 (describing Faubus’ plan to send white stu-
dents to private schools using public funds). Throughout the South there were “white acad-
emies”—private schools immune from judicial review that admitted only whites as a way 
to circumvent Brown. In Virginia’s Prince Edward County, when courts ordered the  
admission of black students, the county simply refused to appropriate money for the 
operation of public schools. This practice lasted from 1959 to 1964. Murphy, supra note 65,  
at 1029 n.57. 
208. Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956). 
209. Dep’t of Conservation & Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956). 
210. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
211. 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
212. Id. at 540. 
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anchored in a statute.213 But Texas was an outlier, as the only state 
that had such a law on the books.214
 The Texas legislature quickly enacted a statute devolving authori-
ty to the executive committee of political parties to set the qualifica-
tions of their primary elections, which promptly passed a resolution 
prohibiting the participation of blacks.215 The statute was challenged 
and struck down.216 The Court was able to find state action, reason-
ing that the statute gave the executive committee the authority to 
exclude potential members, an authority it lacked prior to the enact-
ment.217 Shortly after Condon, the Texas State Democratic Party 
passed a resolution barring blacks from membership.218 Now the sev-
ering between the state and the party was complete. The Party de-
cided to bar blacks on its own accord, without an enabling statute. 
Subsequently, Grovey v. Townsend addressed the question whether 
there is state action when a political party decides to bar blacks from 
membership. Grovey found no state action, allowing political parties 
to bar blacks from being members.219 It was only nine years later,  
in Smith v. Allright, that the Court reversed Grovey, noting that  
Texas regulated the Democratic primaries in a myriad of ways,  
enabling the Court to locate sufficient state action to prohibit the 
barring of blacks.220 This, however, was not the end. In response to  
Smith, the South Carolina legislature, for example, increased its out-
sourced resistance by repealing all the statutes regulating political 
parties, letting the parties discriminate.221 The task of addressing 
further resistance was taken up by lower court judges, who applied 
and extended Smith.222
 As in previous strategies, we can see that even if resistance even-
tually fails, a significant period of time may elapse in the meantime. 
In the white primary cases, litigation continued for nearly twenty 
years until Allwright. During that time, a generation of blacks in the 
South was effectively denied the right to participate in elections. 
 213. Id. at 541. 
214. See Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Conse-
quences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2001) (discussing 
the Court’s power to suppress outliers). 
 215. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 81 (1932). 
216. Id. at 89. 
 217. Id. at 82. 
 218. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 47 (1935). 
219. Id. at 55. It might be argued that since the rule was upheld in Grovey then this 
was not a case of official resistance. Yet I think that misses the point. Despite the favorable 
ruling in Grovey, it seems clear to me that throughout the series of cases Texas sought 
ways to avoid granting blacks the vote, which it most likely understood as being out of step 
with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  
220. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665-66 (1944). 
221. Klarman, supra note 214, at 94. 
 222. Id. at 95. 
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Even after Smith, many officials refused to comply with the ruling, 
and blacks, especially in the rural South, feared physical violence, 
among other things, should they attempt to register.223
 A recent case highlights the modern uses of outsourcing. In 1934, 
members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars placed a cross on federal 
land in the Mojave National Preserve in California, honoring fallen 
soldiers from World War One.224 The cross stood there, undisturbed, 
until 2002, when a federal district court issued an injunction to have 
it removed, reasoning that having a cross on federal land violates  
the Establishment Clause by giving the reasonable observer the im-
pression that the government endorses Christianity.225 After the deci-
sion became final, Congress showed its displeasure with the ruling  
by enacting a land transfer statute, giving the land to the Veterans  
of Wars in exchange for another parcel of land in the Preserve.226
The bill also stipulated that the property would revert to the Gov-
ernment if not maintained “as a memorial commemorating United 
States participation in World War I and honoring the American vet-
erans of that war.”227
 The case then returned to the district court based on a challenge 
to the land transfer. Striking down the statute, the court held that it 
was an invalid attempt to keep the cross, contrary to the Constitution 
and the first court decision.228 However, in the Supreme Court that 
decision was reversed and the statute upheld.229 In an opinion by Jus-
tice Kennedy, the Court reasoned that the government’s purpose was 
not to set its imprimatur on Christianity, or to evade the lower courts’ 
decisions, but to respect fallen soldiers and to maintain the symbolism 
of the monument.230 The Court held that these new circumstances 
required that the bill be upheld and the injunction invalidated.231
 Unlike the white primary cases or the desegregation cases, this 
time the outsourcing worked. By passing the bill, the government 
223. Id. at 96-100. 
 224. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, Buono v. Nor-
ton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004). 
225. Id. at 1217. 
226. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121(a), 
117 Stat. 1098, 1100 (2003). This was not the first statute addressing the problem. In the 
beginning, Congress passed a bill prohibiting the use of government funds to remove the 
cross. A second bill was then passed, identifying the cross as a “national memorial.” A third 
bill, enacted after the district court’s decision, repeated the prohibition on using govern-
ment funds to remove the cross. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
227. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121(e), 
117 Stat. 1098, 1100 (2003).  
228. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d, Buono v. 
Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 229. Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1821. 
 230. Id. at 1808. 
231. Id. at 1820. 
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severed its connection with the land. With the land losing its federal 
status, it was also less susceptible to judicial review, or so the bill’s 
framers intended. Although the Court ended up approving the meas-
ure, in the days and months leading up to the ruling very few people 
were fooled by what the government was trying to do. The New York 
Times, for example, called the land transfer “mere window-dressing.”232
Others have identified Congress’s move as an attempt to evade the  
Establishment Clause.233 Outsourcing, then, is a strategy which  
attempts to disassociate the government from the problematic action, 
but with the intent (or at least the understanding) that the action  
will continue.  
E.   Prioritization 
 Defiance, nonacquiescence and outsourcing are overt measures to 
signal official resistance. Often, however, none of these strategies will 
be needed. In the modern administrative state, agencies and institu-
tions are charged with a variety of tasks with limited resources to 
accomplish them. There is thus a constant “gap between tasks and 
resources,” forcing the institution or official to choose which rule to 
invoke, which behavior to target, and which activity to focus on.234
This is otherwise known as prioritization. Faced with the inability to 
accomplish all its objectives simultaneously, an institution must de-
cide which should be pursued, to what extent, and when. Consider, 
for example, a typical police officer walking her beat in a busy city. In 
the course of her day, she sees a variety of criminal acts, from traffic 
violations, public misconduct, and perhaps even a drug deal or two. 
Even if the officer wants to go after each perpetrator, her resources 
are limited. She must choose by prioritizing—by using her discretion 
in invoking the criminal process.235 Allowing the police to prioritize 
without formally acknowledging so in criminal codes serves identifia-
ble social goals. It maintains the impression of the rule of law, pre-
serves the universalistic symbolism of the criminal law, and avoids the 
acknowledgement that the law is not meant to be taken literally.236
 Although prioritization can be described in the neutral terms of 
task management and limited resources, it can also be a vehicle of 
resistance. Consider, for example, an attorney general who states 
232. Editorial, The Constitution and the Cross, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A28. 
233. David C. Peet, Deed of Mistrust?: The Use of Land Transfers to Evade the Estab-
lishment Clause, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 129 (2009).  
234. NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 114, at 36-37; LIPSKY, supra note 106, at 14. 
235. See Goldstein, supra note 2. 
236. MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF 
LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 73, 77-78 (1973); see also Sanford H. Kadish, Legal 
Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 907 n.7 
(1962) (describing court opinions that portray law enforcement as a compulsory act).  
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that despite a criminal prohibition on homosexual intercourse, he will 
instruct his office not to enforce the prohibition.237 Or consider a police 
officer who overlooks personal consumption of marijuana in a public 
place. Or consider a housing authority official who allocates public 
housing to needy families while neglecting his duty to find housing 
solutions for homeless persons. To be sure, these behaviors can be 
described based on resource constraints: the state cannot prosecute 
all offenses, and many offenses are more harmful than homosexual 
intercourse. Similarly, a police officer cannot investigate all crimes, 
so he chooses to focus on the more serious ones. And finally, a hous-
ing official may decide that helping a needy but functioning family is 
a better use of societal resources than helping homeless persons 
whose chances of rehabilitation are slim.  
 But notice how contingent such explanations are. If we change the 
motive behind the official action, a very different picture emerges. 
What if the Attorney General believes that the homosexual sodomy 
offense is morally illegitimate? What if the police officer believes that 
there is nothing wrong with marijuana and that it should be legal-
ized? And what if the housing official believes that homeless persons 
are not owed anything by society? Surely, in these cases we would 
point out that by prioritizing these officials are actually effectuating 
their agenda about the validity of the law or policy in question. Con-
sequently, it would appear that resistance is present, except that it is 
done through a perfectly legitimate act—prioritization. In other words, 
the discretion the official enjoys facilitates resistance, which is also 
why prioritization as resistance is so difficult to detect.238
 To be sure, the mere exercise of discretion in the course of the pub-
lic official’s work is both inevitable and desirable. But discretion can 
be used in a variety of ways. Resistance through prioritization is 
choosing which task to perform given certain constraints, but making 
that decision with the subjective motive to resist. On the surface, an 
outside observer will not be able to tell the difference between routine 
prioritization and prioritization driven by resistance. This makes 
such resistance more attractive. 
F.   Interpretation 
 The most common strategy of resistance is also the most mun-
dane. Institutions, agencies, and officials are engaged in the act of 
237. In Israel, the Attorney General instructed the police and prosecution not to inves-
tigate or prosecute cases of sodomy, then illegal under Israeli law. Alon Harel, The Rise and 
Fall of the Israeli Gay Legal Revolution, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 443, 453-54 (2000).  
238. See generally Joseph H. Tieger, Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement,
1971 DUKE L.J. 717 (1971) (arguing that the structure of the law enforcement system al-
lows police officers considerable, unchecked discretionary powers). 
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interpretation. Laws, administrative regulations, and court decisions 
require interpretation. Moreover, the interpreter is always interpret-
ing something someone else wrote. This bifurcation between author 
and interpreter renders resistance possible, because it enables the 
law’s addressees to escape the legal control the law seeks to place on 
them. Moreover, the greater the relational distance in this bifurca-
tion, the more room there is for interpretive resistance. For example, 
if a particular agency only rarely encounters the prospect of judicial 
review, the interpretive gap between it and the court grows. The 
threat of sanction may thus be so remote as to not trigger any con-
cerns.239 Even if the agency is involved in litigation, money awards or 
litigation costs that often come at another institution’s expense are 
not a successful deterrent, and thus do not create an optimal incentive  
to comply.240
 One does not have to rehearse the entire indeterminacy debate241
to see that legal texts are open to interpretation, that in many cases 
the texts do not preclude interpretational possibilities, and that those 
possibilities are (also) determined by the officials in charge of imple-
menting these texts. In this sense, interpretation is both hardwired 
into our legal system and a strategy that can be utilized by officials 
contemplating resistance. Thus, an official can come to the conclusion 
that although the text (T) most likely instructs her to do X, she can 
do Y, make Y stick, while making a plausible case that Y is within 
the scope of T, even if she divines the drafter’s intent and text as X. 
This ability corresponds with the limited ability of the removed au-
thor to monitor particular instances of resistant interpretations. 
 Indeed, the practice of interpretation as resistance may be so 
prevalent that we do not think about it in these terms. Interpretation 
is no longer thought of as “an exercise in fixed deductive logic,” but 
rather as “an act of autonomous political creativity.”242 Think, for ex-
ample, about a lower court judge who wants to resist the orders of an 
appellate court. The capacity of that judge to reconcile obedience to 
the higher court while evading its order through the act of distin-
guishing precedent or interpreting the superior court’s holding is well 
239. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009). 
240. HALLIDAY, supra note 189, at 72, 104; Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: 
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). 
Levinson argues that officials respond to political incentives, not financial ones. Id. Conse-
quently, making the government pay compensation will not achieve optimal deterrence. Id. 
241. For a brief summary, see Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 488 (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1999). 
242. Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New Institu-
tionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 925 (1996). 
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known.243 A case in point is Judge Parker’s famous dicta in the South 
Carolina District Court about how Brown required an end to segrega-
tion, but not necessarily integration.244 The division of labor between 
lower and higher courts lends itself to resistance. By giving lower 
courts fact-finding power which is only partially controlled by appel-
late courts, lower courts can make the facts “fit” their desired outcome, 
while knowing that a different spin on the facts will steer the result 
in a different direction.245
 Of course, nothing in this is unique to courts. Although the main-
stay of judicial work is interpretation, every official is engaged, at 
least some of the time, in interpretation. Problems of communication 
and supervision, discussed above, coupled with the relational dis-
tance between disparate institutions and officials, enable resistant 
interpretations. Consequently, the very act of interpretation can be 
viewed as subversive and undermining. Like the case of prioritiza-
tion, it will be nearly impossible to distinguish a good faith attempt 
to apply the law from a subjective motive to resist and the resultant 
interpretation. Short of some external evidence that speaks to the 
official’s state of mind, interpretation is perhaps the most covert form 
of resistance. Its prevalence makes it more attractive to deploy. 
V. IMPLICATIONS
 Dissenting from within is a fact of everyday governance. Still, 
what are we to make of this behavior? This Part briefly sketches out 
three possible types of implications: implications for legal theory, po-
litical life, and institutional design. 
A.   Legal Theory 
 Public officials resist the law. It does not follow, however, that 
they should. A legal theory, therefore, must account for the question 
whether public officials, as opposed to ordinary citizens, have a duty 
to obey the law and when that right might be applicable. Interesting-
ly, although there is a vast literature on the general duty to obey the 
law, this literature rarely concerns itself specifically with the obliga-
tions of public officials. Rather, this obligation is simply assumed, 
viewed as unproblematic, or not even mentioned.246
243. Lawrence Baum, Lower-Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsider-
ing a Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 208, 212 (1978); see also Donald R. Songer et al., The
Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court–Circuit Court In-
teractions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 693 (1994) (finding evidence that ideological considera-
tions allow circuit judges to “shirk” the policy preferences of the Supreme Court). 
244. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).  
245. Murphy, supra note 65, at 1028. 
246. Lyons, supra note 20.  
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 For legal positivists the issue is almost a nonstarter. Positivists 
insist on the separation of law and morals.247 For a positivist, because 
law has no binding moral authority in and of itself, there will be no 
meaningful difference between an individual and an official. As Jo-
seph Raz has written, the law might merit our respect as a prima fa-
cie matter, but this can only amount to a reason to obey the law, ra-
ther than an obligation.248 For positivists, resistance is a moral ques-
tion not a legal one, and in that respect they do not make the distinc-
tion between individuals and officials explicit in their analyses.249
 As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, however, there are 
important differences between citizens and officials. Public officials 
are in charge of making and applying law; they take special oaths to 
uphold it; the legitimacy of the state is bound up with and derived 
from their behavior. These differences, then, also go to the questions of 
whether officials have an obligation to obey the law, whether such an 
obligation is different from that of ordinary citizens, and if so, how.  
 The general question of whether officials are justified in resisting 
the law is complicated precisely because the issue of official re-
sistance is multifaceted and cuts across institutions and roles.250 Still, 
there is much room for theorizing. A legal theory addressing officials’ 
duty to obey the law needs to disaggregate the concept of an official. 
For starters, there are elected and nonelected officials. The democrat-
ic pedigree of each is different; they are accountable to different 
communities, and they serve different purposes. Nonelected officials 
also differ from one another. We tend to have a different view, for ex-
ample, of judges than of bureaucrats. Indeed, the relatively scant lit-
erature that has addressed the duty of officials to obey the law has 
almost always focused on judges, who are usually viewed as a special 
type of official who serve a particular function in the administration 
of justice and, as such, have unique moral, political, and legal obliga-
tions.251 Even the debate about judges’ obligation to obey the law tends 
 247. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958). 
248. See RAZ, supra note 68, at 250. 
 249. Id. at 238-39. Raz makes only a cursory reference to officials when he dismisses 
oaths of office. Similarly, Hart’s discussion of the official’s duty to obey the law is not 
phrased in these terms. Hart was concerned with the administration of rules and rule ap-
plication and less with the individual-official distinction regarding obedience. See Lyons, 
supra note 20, at 848 (describing the Hartian position). 
250. A similar point was made by John Rawls regarding civil disobedience when he 
argued that “[w]e should not expect too much of a theory of civil disobedience . . . . Precise 
principles that straightaway decide actual cases are clearly out of the question. Instead, a 
useful theory defines a perspective within which the problem of civil disobedience can be 
approached.” RAWLS, supra note 15, at 319-20. 
251. See, e.g., Anthony R. Reeves, Do Judges Have an Obligation to Enforce the Law?: 
Moral Responsibility and Judicial-Reasoning, 29 LAW & PHIL. 159 (2010); Steven D. Smith, 
Why Should Courts Obey the Law?, 77 GEO. L.J. 113 (1988). 
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to distinguish “wicked” legal systems from relatively just legal orders. 
There has been a significant amount of writing on the “wicked” legal 
systems, 252 but much less on relatively just legal orders.253
 Thus, a useful legal theory should unpack what it means to be an 
official and should distinguish agent-neutral reasons from agent-
relative reasons. The former are reasons for compliance that all offi-
cials have in common, whereas the latter are reasons unique to par-
ticular officials depending on their role, institutional location, and so 
forth. For instance, there are reasons to think that Gavin Newsom, 
the former mayor of San Francisco, precisely because he was an 
elected official, was somehow more justified in his resistance than the 
San Francisco County Clerk who might have taken the same action. 
Further, a legal theory might take into account not only the official’s 
position in the governmental framework (judge, mayor, agency ex-
pert, street-level bureaucrat, etc.), but also the type of task the offi-
cial is engaged in. For example, it is possible that the justifiability of 
resistance when interpreting the law will be different from the justi-
fiability of resistance when the official is engaged in enforcement ac-
tivity. On further analysis, it might very well be the case that differ-
ent officials possess varying levels of duty to obey the law and that 
there is also a variance according to the specific official activity. As a 
corollary, official resistance may be more legitimate for some officials 
than others and in some contexts more than others.254
B.   Political Life 
 An important implication of official resistance has to do not only 
with the intrinsic value (or disvalue) of such an act, but also with  
the utility or disutility such acts bring about. Public officials use 
resistance as a tool to achieve certain ends. The negative and posi-
tive outcomes associated with resistance, then, affect our normative 
evaluation. While the negative consequences of official resistance  
are familiar,255 several potentially positive outcomes have not drawn  
sufficient attention.  
252. See, e.g., COVER, supra note 21; DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL 
SYSTEMS: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1991). For pos-
iting this distinction, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 111 (1986).  
253. See, e.g., JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD, LIMITS OF LEGALITY: THE ETHICS OF LAWLESS 
JUDGING (2010) (arguing that judges have moral reasons to deviate from the law even in 
cases where the result is simply objectionable rather than extremely unjust). 
254. Recent work on the moral obligations of officials does not make the agent-
neutral/agent-relative distinction, instead treating all officials as the same type. See STEVE 
SHEPPARD, I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL OFFICIALS (2009). 
255. The usual harms cited are damage to the idea of the rule of law, frustration of the 
expectations of citizens, harm to predictability and certainty, and decreased trust in the 
work of public officials.  
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1.   Triggering Discourse and Unblocking Political Channels 
 Resistance can be a bold act. When done overtly, the official draws 
attention to her actions. Sometimes, the repercussions go beyond the 
act itself and can have a wider discursive impact. Consider again 
Gavin Newsom’s decision to issue marriage permits to gay and lesbi-
an couples in San Francisco. Coming on the heels of the Massachu-
setts Goodridge case256 and growing nationwide support for civil un-
ions,257 Newsom’s decision sparked controversy that went beyond the 
local dispute. It ignited a national dialogue. First, it contributed to 
the growing discourse on gay marriage. Newspapers, activists, law-
yers, academics, and ordinary citizens, almost everyone had some-
thing to say.258 As one commentator has written, the decision “put the 
first public face on married lesbian and gay couples.”259 Second, it in-
creased pressure on officials to decide on an issue that, up until then, 
was relatively non-salient and also one on which they had been reluc-
tant to speak. Soon after Newsom’s decision, even President Bush 
had to address the issue, saying he supported a constitutional 
amendment banning gay marriages.260 Third, discourse sparked real 
change, even if some of it was temporary. For example, following San 
Francisco, municipalities in Oregon, New York, New Mexico, and 
New Jersey enacted similar orders.261 More substantial, however, was 
the reaction of thirteen states in 2004 to ban same sex marriage.262
San Francisco’s actions, and other court cases, were viewed to be  
responsible for this backlash.263 Yet after Massachusetts and San 
Francisco, five states (Connecticut, Vermont, Iowa, New York, and 
256. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
257. See, e.g., Dennis Cauchon, Civil Unions Gain Support, USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 2004, at 
3A (citing a USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll finding that 54% of Americans support civil unions). 
258. See, e.g., Kate Kendell, The Right to Marry and the San Francisco Experience, 44 
FAM. CT. REV. 33 (2006) (detailing the reaction to San Francisco’s action, calling it “trans-
formative,” and its effect on popular ballot initiatives, among others); Robin Tyler & Andy 
Thayer, The Gay Marriage Struggle: What’s at Stake and How Can We Win?, in 3 DEFEND-
ING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE FREEDOM-TO-MARRY MOVEMENT: EDUCATION, ADVOCACY,
CULTURE, AND THE MEDIA 17 n.16 (Martin Dupuis & William A. Thompson eds., 2007) (ar-
guing that San Francisco’s action gave “strong impetus to pro-equality street activism 
around the country,” most notably in Chicago). 
259. DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 19 (2006). 
260. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A1. 
261. See KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE 
AND LAW 10 (2006); PINELLO, supra note 259, at 19. 
262. PINELLO, supra note 259, at 20. 
263. Patrick J. Egan et al., Gay Rights, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
TROVERSY 234, 256 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (noting that the sharp backlash 
against gay marriage appears to have been short-lived). 
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New Hampshire) and Washington D.C. approved gay marriage.264
The trajectory is less clear in other states.  
 Whereas San Francisco’s resistance arguably generated support 
and sympathy for gay marriage, official resistance in the South after 
Brown was one of the main causes for the ultimate demise of segre-
gation, resulting in the intervention of the federal government. 
Brown generated fierce resistance by Southern whites, officials and 
non-officials alike. This resistance, some of which was violent, was 
extensively covered in the media, thus alarming many Americans 
who up until then were not aware of the full extent of racial injustice 
in the South. This swung national opinion, formerly wary of forced 
desegregation, which was then translated into political pressure.265
Though it is unlikely that Southern officials intended this particular 
result, it was nevertheless an important consequence of their decision 
to resist. 
 It is unclear whether these discursive explosions ultimately bene-
fited the resisting officials. This assessment depends on what counts 
as a benefit. In the case of segregation and gay marriage, for exam-
ple, resistance did make some officials popular with their constituen-
cy. Still, when we evaluate the effects of resistance, we should not 
look at it only, or at all, from the perspective of the resister. What 
matters are its societal effects. Official resistance, when it is overt 
and visible, places an issue on the national agenda in a way that reg-
ular discourse seldom achieves. Overt resistance is likely to be better 
than covert resistance at promoting dialogue and debate and bring-
ing about meaningful social change. Visible official resistance, be-
cause it is exercised by those with authoritative power, is necessarily 
discussed and debated. Further, it forces engagement with the act 
and it allows others, non-resisters, to reflect on their own practices.266
Thus, it can force action on behalf of superior officials and institu-
tions. Resistance, then, is an opportunity to assess new choices and to 
engage with dissenters in the hope of reconstruction and renegotia-
tion of existing power schemes. 
 264. Connecticut: Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 
2008); Vermont: An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Recognize Equality in Civil Mar-
riage, S. 115 (Vt. 2009); Iowa: Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); New York: 
Marriage Equality Act, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 10-a to 10-b (2011); New Hampshire: An 
Act Relative to Civil Marriage and Civil Unions, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1 (2010); 
Washington D.C.: D.C. CODE § 46-401 (2010). 
265. See generally KLARMAN, supra note 10.
266. See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism 
All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 62, 67 (2010). 
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2.   Signaling 
 In economics, signaling describes a way in which one actor may 
convey important, otherwise unobservable information to another 
actor.267 In the context of official resistance, resistance signals, at 
least to the superior official or institution, a broken chain. It can 
highlight entrenched problems that might otherwise be overlooked, 
problems for which the particular act of resistance might only be a 
proxy. Resistance can serve as an important alarm for policymakers 
and administrators who are often in charge of complex networks 
where they have little control over particular processes and even less 
knowledge about the goings on in these networks.   
 As a corollary, and paradoxically, awareness of official resistance 
may even improve the rule of law. Social scientists have long noted 
how the more salient an event, the stronger it is etched in one’s con-
sciousness.268 Extreme cases of official resistance, then, might be 
viewed as so repugnant and disturbing that they paradoxically con-
tribute to a renewed respect for law, law enforcement, and compli-
ance. Resistance might generate public anger and reinforce social 
norms about appropriate behavior.269 It is possible, for example, that 
Southern resistance to Brown unfolded in such a way, eventually bol-
stering civil rights more generally and making racism and discrimi-
nation socially and legally unacceptable. 
3.   Policy Change 
 Official resistance might lead to policy change. The Eleventh 
Amendment was a direct result of massive state resistance to 
Chisholm v. Georgia.270 The Kentucky land use case resulted in fed-
eral capitulation and the enactment of the Homestead Act. In those 
cases, official resistance might be considered favorable as it barred 
un-implementable and unrealistic policies. Official resistance in the 
South resulted in federal intervention that gave rise to the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act that sought to counter 
this resistance.
267. See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 358 (1973). 
268. See, e.g., Sven-Åke Christianson & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Memory for Traumatic 
Events, in 1 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 225 (1987); John E. Newhagen & Byron 
Reeves, The Evening’s Bad News: Effects of Compelling Negative Television News Images 
on Memory, 42 J. COMM. 25 (1992). 
269. Emile Durkheim made a similar argument with regard to crime. See EMILE 
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 58 (W. D. Halls trans., 1984); Jonathan L. 
Entin, Responding to Political Corruption: Some Institutional Considerations, 42 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 255, 275 (2011) (making a similar argument regarding political corruption).  
270. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI; see LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
EUROPEAN UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 161 (2001). 
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 Of course, one could argue that official resistance does not neces-
sarily bring about good policy changes, which makes judging its justi-
fiability ex ante difficult, if not impossible. This is true, yet the point 
is not that resistance will only lead to good policy changes, but rather 
that it has the potential to do so. Indeed, it is doubtful whether offi-
cial resistance would even be contemplated by certain actors if they 
did not think that there was at least a chance that their resistance 
would lead to a change in policy. These developments, then, should 
result in the rejection of our kneejerk reaction that militates against 
officials resisting the law.  
4.   Justice 
 Official resistance may serve the interests of justice when officials 
challenge unjust policies. While such resistance may generate im-
portant discourse that will also result in policy change, it can also be 
valuable for its own sake. Recall the example about the attorney gen-
eral who refuses to prosecute persons who engaged in homosexual 
conduct. Although the attorney general must enforce the law, she be-
lieves that such an offense discriminates on the basis of sexual orien-
tation. Or consider the case of a state department of health that de-
cides to supply generic HIV/AIDS medication to indigents even if it 
violates federal laws protecting patents.271 The health department 
justifies the move by explaining that many people cannot purchase 
life-saving drugs, but that it cannot afford the expensive patent-
protected drugs, hence the turn to generic drugs that are a fraction of  
the cost. 
 While both of these examples may be controversial, they also ar-
guably advance the cause of justice. Such acts of official resistance 
may end up changing criminal policy or pharmaceutical patent poli-
cy, but they also seek to do justice in the here and now. This aspect of 
official resistance is often overlooked because law is understood as an 
instrument that moderates power—without law, there can be no lib-
erty. Consequently, the exercise of power outside law is suspect. And 
yet, power can also be used benevolently.272 Officials have the power 
not only to act according to law, but also the opportunity to use state 
power for just causes.
271. This example is based on South Africa’s use of generic drugs to treat its population 
that could not afford the patent protected drugs. See William W. Fisher III & Cyrill P. 
Rigamonti, The South Africa AIDS Controversy: A Case Study in Patent Law and Policy 
(Feb. 10, 2005), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf. 
272. Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J.
561, 566 (1977) (book review). 
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 To be sure, it does not follow that all cases of official resistance are 
similarly just. But granting absolute status to the rule of law has its 
price; namely, it can stand in the way of accomplishing desirable ends.  
5.   Efficiency 
 Official resistance may generate greater efficiency. Often, full 
compliance is either not attractive or it has the potential to thwart 
other important governmental objectives.273 In other words, legal vio-
lations can be efficient where the prescribed legal arrangement leads 
to suboptimal results. In their study of regulatory compliance, Eu-
gene Bardach and Robert Kagan explain how, in exchange for over-
looking certain violations, regulators can achieve more meaningful 
compliance with administrative policy. In particular, they note that 
regulators often ignore violations that pose no serious risk and refuse 
to enforce regulatory requirements that are “especially costly or dis-
ruptive in relation to the additional degree of protection they would 
provide.”274 In addition, regulators often give extensions on deadlines 
that are statutorily mandated, even when they do not have discretion 
to extend them. They do so in cases where they believe the firm is 
acting in good faith and taking reasonable steps in its attempt to 
comply with regulatory standards.275
 Although regulators often act in ways contrary to the legislation 
that regulates their activity, they do so because they believe (and 
empirical evidence supports this) that they can meet regulatory goals 
by not “going by the book,” i.e. by not enforcing every regulatory provi-
sion. In this way, regulators can secure cooperation, gain access to in-
formation, and establish good working relations with regulated firms. 
In other words, this creates more efficient enforcement mechanisms. 
C.   Institutional Design 
 The preceding discussion sought to show that the outcomes of offi-
cial resistance are not always negative, and quite often desirable. 
However, since official resistance is acted through institutional struc-
tures, issues of institutional design must be considered so that pro-
ductive official resistance might be incentivized over unproductive 
official resistance. This can take several forms, such as the ex ante 
design of laws, policies, and institutions, and the ex post use of specif-
273. See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 
1743 (2005); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case 
for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 114 (2005) (arguing 
that excessive enforcement can discourage socially beneficial behavior). 
274. EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF 
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 134 (Transaction Publishers 2002) (1982). 
275. Id. at 138.
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ic legal tools following instances of resistance. The precise design of 
such measures is beyond the scope of this Article, but some general 
points are sketched out below. 
 Legislation and policymaking means working to secure a coalition, 
drafting a bill, holding debates, making compromises along the way, 
and generating sufficient interest among the relevant actors, all of 
which require the investment of considerable political resources. It is 
no wonder, then, that at the enactment stage relatively little atten-
tion is paid to future compliance. But if official resistance happens, 
and supposing we seek to address it in some way, more effort should 
be given to this aspect from the beginning. Public policy scholars 
have long been engaged in the study of implementation, but for the 
most part they have focused on issues of design which hinder success-
ful implementation rather than on public officials who actively resist 
the law.276 Laws, then, should be designed with an eye toward com-
pliance, and legislators should realize that enacting a law is not tan-
tamount to its application.277 Laws and policies that will be disre-
garded are generally a waste of legislative resources278 and harmful 
to the ideal of the rule of law. Some of the tools which legislators 
might use include, but are not limited to, limited delegations, clearer 
articulation of legislative goals, weeding out conflicting objectives, 
and improving interagency cooperation. Such tools may be able to 
minimize resistance, but they also come at a cost: the potential curb-
ing of positive resistance.  
 There is a glaring tension here. If official resistance is pervasive, 
even inevitable, how can officials design laws to promote implemen-
tation or compliance? How could these laws work if resistance is per-
vasive? And how could the mechanisms for promoting compliance be 
rendered immune from acts of official resistance? The answer, I 
think, must be that official resistance occurs on a spectrum. From the 
fact of its existence and inevitableness does not follow that it always 
exists everywhere and all the time. If official resistance is inevitable, 
this only means that legal structures cannot fully control it. It does 
not follow that it cannot be controlled at all. Consider, for example, 
276. See HILL & HUPE, supra note 5 (summarizing implementation research focusing 
on problems of interagency cooperation, limited resources, and conflicting legislative goals, 
but not on official resistance). 
277. See Clune & Lindquist, supra note 126, at 1055-59 (1981) (arguing that the study 
of implementation yields information on how to design better policies); Fiona Haines, Fac-
ing the Compliance Challenge: Hercules, Houdini or the Change of the Light Brigade?, in
EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 287, 288 (Christine Parker 
& Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011) (stating that law is rarely designed with compli-
ance exclusively in mind). 
278. I say “generally” because it is possible to imagine symbolic or populist legislation 
where there will be little expectation of compliance. Here, the expected official resistance 
will be part of the political game. Still, I think these cases are relatively rare.  
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the bureaucratic context, which has witnessed some transitioning 
from command and control regulation to forms of new governance.279
Command and control regulation was responsible for the rule-based, 
top-down, hierarchical regulation. New governance regimes adopt a 
bottom-up approach, decentralize authority, move from rule-based to 
standard-based norms, and generally embrace a participatory, flexi-
ble, deliberative, and collaborative model of governance.280 This 
trend, especially the move from rules to standards, might minimize 
some instances of official resistance for two reasons. First, authority 
and discretion is devolved to officials and regulated industries. It is 
they who construct the meaning of compliance,281 which makes re-
sistance to superior rules and directives less likely. Second, resistance 
to standards is more difficult. If official resistance means a subjective 
desire to resist the official’s interpretation of the law, standards give 
her greater interpretive room, so that there will be less conflict be-
tween her preferences and her interpretive choice because of their 
contextual nature and the broader range of possibilities they entail.282
While new governance regimes are designed with an eye toward in-
centivizing private sector compliance,283 they also affect the work of 
bureaucrats who, together with industries, generate the standards to 
be followed.284 This inclusive regime, then, makes opting-out less like-
ly. My point here is not to praise new governance regimes so much as 
to underscore that compliance is not a binary concept; it can be ma-
nipulated through institutional design.285
 A second way to manipulate the level of resistance is through spe-
cial monitoring institutions. Although courts monitor resistance, 
their ability is limited, partly because they are a reactive institution 
and partly because resistance is often covert. But other institutions 
complement the work of courts. The Comptroller General (and other 
comptrollers), inspectors general, the Government Accountability Of-
fice, state ethics commissions, and others, all seek, explicitly or im-
279. See sources cited supra note 92. 
280. See generally BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 274 (discussing the legalistic nature 
of regulation and the transition to more flexible modes); Lobel, supra note 92.  
281. See, e.g., Shauhin A. Talesh, The Privatization of Public Legal Rights: How Manu-
facturers Construct the Meaning of Consumer Law, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 527 (2009). 
 282. Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities 
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 30 (2008) (arguing that new governance makes compliance 
easier because principles are more sensitive to context).  
283. Lobel, supra note 92, at 308, 311. 
284. Id. at 312, 338, 343 (discussing how government agencies, including the EEOC 
and OSHA, assist firms in the development of plans that must meet performance require-
ments, which then have to be certified by the agency).  
285. Indeed, not all new governance regimes are made of the same cloth. New govern-
ance can also mean more official resistance because regulators might forgo some legal re-
quirements in order to achieve other, more important regulatory aims. See BARDACH &
KAGAN, supra note 274, at 134, 138. 
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plicitly, to minimize the occurrence of official resistance. And yet rel-
atively little attention has been given to their performance or to the 
authority and powers they wield.286 Thus, an interest in official re-
sistance entails an evaluation of the institutions that are charged 
with detecting such behavior.  
 Last, addressing official resistance means taking stock of such di-
verse tools as whistleblower protections, civil service law provisions, 
and disciplinary tools. These tools tend to view official resistance as a 
negative phenomenon that should be penalized. But our discussion 
has demonstrated that official resistance also brings about arguably 
positive results. Supposing we also seek to acknowledge and even in-
centivize instances of official resistance, the application of such tools 
and doctrines should be sensitive to the positive values that may be 
derived from the resistance they originally seek to minimize. This 
might mean that not every act of resistance should be reprimanded 
by taking disciplinary action. And perhaps not every act of resistance 
should be viewed harshly by comptrollers, inspectors, and various 
law enforcers. If official resistance also serves positive values, then 
this has implications for the design of institutions and doctrines that 
otherwise seek to minimize its occurrence.  
 We have a sweeping aversion toward official resistance. Given its 
costs, such as undermining the rule of law and creating uncertainty, 
this is understandable. Yet sometimes it may make sense to allow re-
sistance. We might accept resistance, ex post, when we have sufficient 
information about its possible and real costs once it has been actuated. 
What is needed, then, is a fact sensitive analysis in specific cases that 
will inform the decisionmaking processes of monitoring institutions.   
VI. CONCLUSION
 Resistance and dissent are not unique to the private sphere vis-à-
vis the state. Indeed, this Article has called for shifting the focus 
from private resistance to official resistance. Public officials who re-
sist legal demands imposed by superior officials and institutions are 
not an anomaly in our legal system. Official resistance is an inescap-
able part of governance, in that it is derived from the basic institu-
tional structures set up by law. Paradoxically, attempting to induce 
compliance leaves institutional structures susceptible to the very re-
sistance they seek to avoid. 
286. But see Kevin T. Abikoff, Note, The Role of the Comptroller General in Light of 
Bowsher v. Synar, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1539 (1987); Kathryn E. Newcomer, The Changing 
Nature of Accountability: The Role of the Inspector General in Federal Agencies , 58 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 129 (1998); James R. Richards & William S. Fields, The Inspector General 
Act: Are Its Investigative Provisions Adequate to Meet Current Needs?, 12 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 227 (1990). 
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 This Article demonstrated the various ways public officials go 
about resisting, from overt strategies to more covert forms. If re-
sistance is indeed prevalent, there are implications which follow. I 
discussed some of these implications, especially those pertaining to 
legal theory, political life, and institutional design. Although it is 
natural to think of official resistance as harmful, there are instances 
where it might be thought of as normatively desirable. The problem 
is to identify the conditions under which beneficial official resistance 
occurs. For example, as aforementioned, overt resistance is likely to 
be better than covert resistance at promoting dialogue and debate 
and bringing about meaningful social change. To be sure, it very well 
might be that, all things considered, official resistance does more 
harm than good. I make no claim to that effect. But official resistance 
can also not be an either/or proposition. In order to evaluate its de-
sirability and implications, an investigation is needed into its causes  
and effectuation.
 Ultimately, the diffusion and inculcation of legal norms depend on 
a myriad of factors. Law cannot be understood in a vacuum, but ra-
ther as one system vying for supremacy among competing systems 
and constraints. Although we would like to think that, among public 
officials, law will prevail and other considerations will lose out, that 
is not always the case. As lawyers, this is especially difficult for us  
to acknowledge.
 Official resistance demonstrates that the legal norm is shaped and 
constructed via a dialectical process, involving both superiors and 
subordinates. Power travels in both directions, from the maker to the 
implementer, but also back from the implementers to the maker. 
Thus, the study of official resistance sheds light on how officials per-
ceive their role and on how a legal norm is diffused, internalized, or 
rejected by other legal actors. If we identify law with the state, and at 
the same time believe that it is the same law all the way down, then 
we are overlooking the fragmentation within the state that gives rise 
to instances of official resistance. Mapping forms of official resistance 
illuminates the workings of law in a world of potentially indetermi-
nate norms, multiple institutions, and human individuality. Taking 
official resistance seriously means accepting law’s only partial ability 
to constrain and compel official action. 
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